

# Marine Corps

APR 1958

FORTY CENTS

# Gazette



# Marine Corps Gazette

APRIL 1958  
NUMBER 4  
VOLUME 42

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**Marine Corps  
Gazette**



**WITH EASTER FAST APPROACHING**, we asked Sgt Allyn A. Humphreys of MCAS, Quantico, to take a picture of the new Marine Corps Schools' Chapel. Our cover this month is the result of his efforts.

Last month we sent out questionnaires to our representatives in the field asking for comments on how to improve the magazine, what type of articles you like and dislike, etc. The answers are beginning to arrive here in the editorial office and are proving to be a help in planning future issues.

We are particularly desirous of hearing from the officers who are serving with the reorganized 1st MarDiv. Relatively few Marine officers have had experience with the

new structure and the rest of us are anxious to know how the new shoes fit.

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
Bergstrom Air Force Base, near Austin, Texas. Altogether, the fast-moving DW20s are getting up to 20,500 cu. yd. in a 20-hour working day on hauls of 1 to 2½ miles round trip.

## Job report on Bergstrom A.F.B. construction

Near Austin, Texas, the H. B. Zachry Company is building runways, taxiways and other facilities for the new Bergstrom Air Force Base. This is a big operation—2,370,000 cu. yd. of excavation. In addition, it calls for 300,000 yd. of select base material and 503,000 yd. of concrete pavement. Runways are 12,250 ft. long, 300 ft. wide.

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**WANTED—  
THE HARD WORK**





### Salesmen?

... The time has come to relieve Commanding officers of additional duties as magazine salesmen. Obviously I refer to the current (and ever present) campaign within the Corps to solicit the membership of Marine Officers in the Marine Corps Association, thereby exposing them to a fine magazine, the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. The Commandant of the Marine Corps must consider this Association and its mouthpiece worthwhile for he serves as its president, and has several of his top flight commanders on the ruling body.

During my time as a Marine officer I have, on every tour of duty, been told that the GAZETTE is a must for all Marine officers; that the information contained therein and the opportunity to exchange ideas within the military profession is invaluable in the furtherance of my career. If such is the case, I certainly want to take advantage of this golden opportunity and I'm certain that all Marine officers could feel the same. A glance at the purposes of the Association reveals an educational, professional and traditional approach to objectives that are indeed worthwhile.

We have here the means of reaching every Marine officer, why not do so? Let us make membership in The Marine Corps Association mandatory for all Marine Corps officers on active duty. Include this membership as a requirement in the Marine Corps Manual the same as blues, the mourning band, the sword and other items that are presently required. After the initial shock has worn off, I am confident that the thinking officer will welcome the opportunity to belong to the Association and we will have relieved our already harassed COs of an additional duty.

MAJ L. E. FRIBOURG

MCLFDC,  
MCS, Quantico, Va.

### Back in the Ole Corps . . .

... The letter written by 2dLt Bleiweiss (GAZETTE: Feb. '58) suggests "Somewhere in the higher echelons of

command there should be a major decision on this presently untenable situation." The foregoing statement, of course, refers to the "13 man squad drill" wherein it is bemoaned that lack of scheduled time for the conduct of the drill during the normal training schedule, lack of knowledge, qualified instructors, etc., makes it difficult to master.

The quoted "Somewhere in the higher echelons," etc., causes us to put our "oar in."

We desire to point out that the decision was made when the Commandant incorporated the "13-man squad drill" into the training program Marine Corps wide!

The only "decision" that needs to be made is the decision on the part of the squad and platoon leaders (italics supplied) that they will teach and their men will learn!

The time spent on gassing about drill manual interpretation could well be spent in doing the drill exactly as specified in the manual. Long ago this writer was advised by an old salt, "Read what is written; do what is written;—and don't never interpret what ain't written!"

Nothing precludes the use of additional instruction to develop proficiency. In support units—and we assume this is the case in question—wherein troops must be physically present in their assigned billets to support Division units from 0800-1630, why not add one-half hour to the beginning or end of the work day and utilize that time for drill instruction?

The figures in the manual are quite easily read; and chalking or painting actual footprints on the macadam is not a startling new idea. All it takes is the blessing of the unit CO, a small amount of initiative, a large amount of enthusiasm and leadership!

It is our opinion that too much "training time" is wasted in "coffee breaks," PX runs, mobile canteen queues, extended "noon" hours and "long weekends." We think that in this respect the Marine Corps could well do some reminiscing.

Remember the 5 and a half day work

week? Saturday morning was the Old Man's inspection day and he made it last until noon or later. Not because he was being a "stinker" but because he felt it was his duty to inspect in great detail all the places where his men had sweated to get cleaned for his inspection. A good word here, a "growl" when it was needed was his method of building "pride" in his unit. There wasn't a rifle, locker, bunk, haircut, uniform, storeroom, galley or office that was overlooked. The Old Man was never "Gordie Goodguy," but he was always firm and just.

And remember the Corporal with 16 years service who asked the First Sergeant why he had to march a police detail of 159 men to the police shed? He felt he was being discriminated against because that was a Pfc's job! The First Sergeant told him he was the junior corporal and he didn't have a Pfc available. Now we send Staff NCOs or Lieutenants with smaller groups.

And early chow—remember? Early chow meant you fell in at the head of the normal mess formation, stood in the mess hall until you got "seats," ate as rapidly as possible and raced back to your unit to relieve the man standing by. Then he raced to the mess hall.

There weren't 50 men being fed early and getting hot chow at the expense of the bulk of the unit eating regular chow and getting warm food. And that's a big esprit factor today.

And when you were all sharpened up for liberty the company Gunnery Sergeant would look you over, and real friendly-like ask you what you knew about the machine gun, and you told him you knew it inside out, so he said "Strip it and name the parts before you pick up your liberty card." Remember?

Whatever happened to those days? We killed them, you and I, by swinging with the wind, just like a weather vane, instead of standing against the wind like the giant redwood tree. We've watched the changes and said, "They ought to do something about this," but they didn't. But while we're remembering, let's remember—the wind can change direction.

Maybe it will blow our way again. Let's be ready this time. Be a redwood!

CAPT J. E. FORDE, JR.  
I-I 3d Ord Fld Maint Co  
NMCRTC, Lawrence, Mass.

### Physical Fitness—Again

... In regards to physical fitness in such articles as "Fit to Fight" (GAZETTE:

(Continued on page 5)

★  
The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center  
★





Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, N. J.

## DREAMS WITH A PURPOSE

*"Leave the beaten track occasionally and dive into the woods. You will be certain to find something you have never seen before."*

ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL

THERE have always been dreams and high hopes in the communications business. And always, for something over eighty years, there has been continuous and determined research to help make those dreams come true.

For before there was a telephone there was a telephone laboratory.

First it was just two men, Bell and Watson, in an attic workshop. Then the idea grew, as the need grew, and the practical values of research became more and more apparent.

The activities of the Bell Telephone Laboratories now cover many fields and

go exploring and developing in many directions. But the main purpose is directed to one goal. It is the betterment of communications service and the finding of ways to provide this better service at the lowest cost to the customer.

The great assets of the Bell Laboratories are the judgment and knowledge that have been gained from years of experience, combined with the enthusiasm of minds versed in the newest scientific knowledge.

There is also the encouragement of initiative through a careful balance of pure research and developmental work. The scientist is given a freedom that is rare in industrial work.

Some of the great achievements of the Bell Telephone Laboratories have come in recent years.

The Transistor is a Bell Telephone Laboratories invention. So is the Bell


Solar Battery. So, too, are the switching machines that have brought about Direct Distance Dialing. And, again, there was the development of those wonderful amplifiers for the underseas telephone cables across the Atlantic and under the Pacific to Hawaii.

It all adds up to a great deal of progress. But there is much more to come. All that has been done is but the beginning.

Never have there been so many opportunities for wholly new developments in communications service and so much well-rounded research behind them.


Each day there are excursions off the beaten path, revealing something that has never been seen before.

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#### DIRECT DISTANCE DIALING

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## A CONCEPT OF SCIENCE

Five years ago, The Martin Company conceived a unique undertaking in the field of pure science which grew out of a belief that our own and our country's resources in creative scientific research must be greatly enlarged and cultivated.

We believed that the country—and the Company—that concentrates on short-range material achievements, without a deep concern for the creative source of tomorrow's even greater achievements, will have no tomorrow.

It is now three years since that belief motivated management's action with the foundation of a program in pure research. Known as the Research Institute of Advanced Study, RIAS is now a substantial organization staffed by scientists who are working in many fields, including theoretical physics, biochemistry, metallurgy and mathematics, without short-range applied research requirements.

Today, the increasing appeals to industry and the nation for accelerated activities in basic research give the RIAS story a special significance. For creative research in pure science is the true life source of our technological security—the "seed bed" from which our national strength shall continue to grow.

**MARTIN**  
BALTIMORE • DENVER • ORLANDO

Nov. '57) and numerous letters to the GAZETTE, I would like to submit the following information on physical fitness as it applies to the Soviet Armed Forces.

The striking characteristic of Soviet training is the great importance placed on physical conditioning at all times. Regularly scheduled exercises every morning, in addition to the periods allotted during the day for physical conditioning. Every moment to and from training sites is converted to physical conditioning by double timing and forced marches. Sunday afternoon is for organized athletics and active participation is required. Rigorous physical conditioning is stressed throughout every stage of the training cycle. An example is that the winter training cycle of 4 to 5 months calls for a total of 50 hours of physical exercise.

There are units in the Marine Corps that only call for a total of 13 hours of physical exercise a quarter; some units none!

Only when the physical fitness exams come around do some units make an effort to get in shape. The exam itself, if scored by the point system in FM 21-20, *Physical Training*, would only give the man who passed, a rating of "poor."

Why is it only a few units in the corps (such as Recon units), and not *all* the units stress physical training and conditioning?

Why can't motor transport personnel run to the motor park, comm personnel to the comm shack, and aircraft mechs to the flight line? Anything less than one mile can be done in less than ten minutes. The only reason is the Platoon Sergeant is too lazy or the unit commanders do not "stress" physical conditioning. I have seen physical exercise cancelled "because the men would catch cold after working up a sweat" or, "it's not important anyway."

It is important. It's important that the Marine Corps remains physically fit to perform its mission at any and all times. It is just as important to remain physically fit during peacetime as it is during hostilities. The stress on physical conditioning should be the same after the last shot has been fired as it was during combat. Don't lose a man on some hill because he wasn't physically able to carry on (and it has happened).

Substitute 20 minutes a day for physical training—5 days a week and forget organized athletics. Men will participate in athletics on their own if they are interested enough in sports.

There isn't a unit in the Corps that can't schedule 20 to 30 minutes a day


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(Continued from page 5)

for physical exercise, and no Marine is so important that he can't be spared during physical exercise.

Twenty minutes a day for a 4-month period would be about 27 hours (as compared to the Soviets 50 hours). This 20 minutes a day, along with marches, regular training and double timing almost everywhere would give us a well-conditioned, lean corps of Marines and the supply system could do away with those size 42 shorts.

TSgt J. W. JAUNAL

18 "B" Copper Drive  
29 Palms, Calif.

## Pride and Prestige

... I have read many fine letters and articles in the GAZETTE in regards to "Responsibilities." Also there are a number of directives on the subject.

In regards to the placement of responsibilities to enhance the pride and prestige of an individual, officer or enlisted, we need refer to the old cliché "Responsibilities gravitate to shoulders that can carry them."

MSGT ELZY KEES, JR.

Medford, Oregon

## Boots, Boots . . .

... It used to be "Green side out, brown side out, or no side out." Now it is "Polish boots and field shoes, or not to polish boots and field shoes."

If the Marine Corps desires us to polish the field shoe/boot why do we have a reversed leather type boot? It would be much easier to return to the old high-top dress shoe and it could be polished without the pounds of polish and elbow grease needed to achieve the resemblance to a shine we now strive for. The paratroopers have a finished leather type of boot that is easy to shine, why not the Marine Corps?

In the past 5 years I have seen at least 5 different orders, directives, etc., on the polishing of the boot/field shoe; one letter says, not to polish, the other says, to polish. Then another letter states "... a high gloss is not desired, rather, enough polish to preserve the leather." I say "BEANS" saddle soap or neats-foot oil will preserve a leather shoe much better than polish. As a parting shot, polishing the boot/field shoe closes the pores in the shoe, no air, sweating feet, blisters and trouble.

MSGT B. M. ROSOFF

MCS, Quantico, Va.

## Atomic Battalion

"... Coming events cast their shadow before" is a phrase as much used these days as abused. Certain it is that we live amidst many darksome shadows which are all too ominous for human beings

and institutions. Free individuals, mighty nations and civilizations have grave reasons to ponder today's shadows.

Amidst so many modern malign shadows I would like to think of Maj Semnoff's article (GAZETTE: Jan '58) as a contemporary benign, albeit fleeting shadow — of an event or time to come which because of the intensified and undisputed scientific, technical and military leadership of the United States conjoined to our international re-establishment of law, justice and honor among all nations and men will win the most difficult of all human battles — not of war by massive destruction and might but of peace by the sterner and more rational disciplines of justice and right for our own U.S.A. and for all the nations and men under God.

REV. JOSEPH I. MANNING, M.A.

St. Philip's Church  
San Francisco, Calif.

## Marine or marine?

... For some time now a discussion has been in progress as to the correct way to use the word Marine when it refers to US Marines.

The pros of the argument feel that when the word Marine is used in a sentence it should be capitalized.

The cons feel that the word marine should not be capitalized.

We have searched our records, including the Marine Corps Manual, and we cannot find an answer to this. Could you get us an answer and give us the reference from official or semi-official sources?

Many thanks for your trouble.

TSgt S. F. RIPA

Naval Air Station  
Jacksonville, Fla.

ED: You raise an interesting question. Webster's dictionary does not capitalize the word "marine." Present style of the Marine Corps GAZETTE does capitalize the word Marine/Marines, and apparently with good precedent. On 5 Oct 1775 the Continental Congress used the word Marines for the first time in our history. In an order issued to Gen Washington on that date, the General was directed to "secure two armed vessels" and "to give orders for the proper encouragement to the Marines and seamen" that served on these vessels. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated 9 May 1941, President Roosevelt referred to Marines (capital M).

The last 3 Commandants of the Marine Corps in their annual birthday message to the Marine Corps have capitalized the M in Marine.

We feel that our style of using the word Marine (capital M) is correct and puts us in excellent company.

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## RELIABILITY POSES FOR ITS PICTURE


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


MajGen PENDLETON



MajGen LEJEUNE

## *A TOCSIN F*



MajGen UPSHUR



Perhaps commanders are not articulate enough about Command.

Why is it that we hear so much about management and administration, and so little about Command?

By LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr.

# N FOR COMMAND

✿ WHILE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS and new philosophies and concepts of warfare combine to place greater and greater demands on the leadership and authority of military men, a creeping paralysis has come through the cellar door to strike the very foundation of our military structure—the element and principle of command.

Has command become obsolete as a concept of military authority and organization?

There are many who profess the belief that the principle of command is somewhat outmoded in these days of bureaucratic efficiency. Most of us will probably agree that the current status of the command principle is far from what it might be. Yet, while we bewail the situation and pay much lip service to command on one hand, we weaken and cheapen it on the other.

There is not much doubt about it. Command, the basic concept of

military organization, is being subjected to progressive adulteration. Command, the keystone of military effectiveness, is being weakened to a dangerous degree. Command, the essential to victory on the battlefield, is suffering from a gradual hardening of the arteries.

An examination of command and its components gives an excellent picture of the difficulties which beset the command concept. While these difficulties exist at all levels of our military structure, this discussion will be directed toward the battalion and squadron because of the tremendous effect of command adulteration on that important level of command.

What is meant by the term command? Marines need go no further than the Marine Corps Manual for a definition.

"Command is the authoritative direction exercised over a unit or individual of the Naval Establishment in all matters pertaining to the conduct of military affairs not specifically excepted by higher authority.

"Inherent in command are the following features:

- a. Precedence over all personnel serving in the command.
- b. The responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the units or personnel concerned.
- c. The power to enforce the official will of the commander through the issuance of necessary directives.
- d. The authority to make inspections to assure compliance with such directives.
- e. The initiation or application of disciplinary measures incident thereto."

While a cursory examination of these basic elements of command may not disclose clearly any incipient areas of difficulty, a closer look can give us a few clues.

Examine the phrase "not specifically excepted by higher authority" in the above definition. While it is true

that "higher authority" often appears to make many such exceptions, these are frequently more imaginary than real. All too often, the easy way out for a commander is to conjure up in his mind the picture of "higher authority" preventing an action which might pose some minor inconvenience for himself.

The inherent precedence of command can degenerate into a disregard of others. The responsibility of command sometimes gets mixed up in a maze of administrative, technical and bureaucratic channels. It may be lost through a disregard of command channels. The power to enforce official will through issuance of necessary directives all too frequently becomes a *carte blanche* for a flood of paper orders. The authority to make inspections is easily overlooked or turned over to some subordinate. The initiation of disciplinary measures may be hampered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but it is also hampered by a lack of knowledge of that instrument.

There is no doubt that the above conditions detract from the stature and effectiveness of command and thus weaken it.

Turning from the abstract to the individual, consider the commander. Who might he be and what are his responsibilities?

"Command is exercised by virtue of office or by special assignment of commissioned officers, warrant officers, or noncommissioned officers, who are eligible by law to exercise command.

"The responsibility of the commander is absolute except to the extent that he is relieved of responsibility by competent authority or by regulations.

"The commander of an organization is its controlling head. The commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility to his subordinates."

These excerpts from the Marine Corps Manual emphasize one of the causes of command deterioration. There is no doubt that much of the sickness of command will stem from the commander . . . "he alone is responsible." On the other hand, his difficulties may stem from sources beyond his control. Before condemning the "next higher headquarters" (why is it always "this headquarters" and not "this commander"?), a commander might first take stock of his difficulties and see if they can be traced to himself. For example: compulsory school quotas—that old bugaboo—can frequently be traced to the failure of a battalion or squadron commander to provide his own training to his sobbing request for "qualified personnel."

Turn now to the elements that are weakening our command structure. These are not easy to find and they vary to a considerable degree within corresponding commands and in different levels of command. Some weakening factors can be found throughout our command structure. Some result from conditions within or without a command. Some are created through inexperience or apathy. Some have come into being so gradually that their presence is accepted as a proper condition. All of these appear to be interrelated and one frequently begets the other.

At the battalion or squadron level, the enemies of command might be considered in 2 general categories—those external to the command and those that are within the sphere of the commander.

Principal among the external enemies of command at the battalion or squadron level are: instability, inexperience and bureaucracy.

Instability as an enemy of our command structure includes those factors which create instability at the command levels. An endless change of battalion and squadron commanders, transfers of company, battery and platoon commanders, and a succession of section and squad leaders do not contribute to a stable, cohesive and combat ready command. Nor does it enhance the stature and effectiveness of command. Requirements for career management, rotation policies and the tremendous annual turnover of officers and enlisted men are prime causes of this




**LtCol Reichner** was commissioned in 1941 after graduating from the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as Training Officer, G-3, FMFPac; Naval Gunfire Officer, 1st MarDiv; CO, 4th Bn, 11th Marines; Head, Training Section, O&T Branch, G-3, HQMC. He attended the Naval War College in 1957, and now serves there as an instructor.

undesirable situation. There is not much that can be done about these conditions without denying large numbers of officers the experience of command, adopting a unit rotation policy and, of course, inducing more young officers and experienced junior NCO's to remain in the service (this is a problem for the Bureau of the Budget and Congress as well as lower levels). On the other hand, the Marine in the battery, company or platoon who is faced with an endless succession of squad or section leaders, platoon commanders, company commanders, or battalion commanders is less effective at the receiving end of a human chain reaction than he might be with stability at command levels. Regardless of cost, commanders must take every possible step to eliminate this condition which makes the commander a passerbey rather than a man at the helm.

Inexperience is the handmaiden to instability. While experience is gained through command, there is much that can be done to prepare the commander for his duties. Our wonderful school system is not enough. All officers must be exposed to continual guidance and training for command by their seniors, regardless of their assignment and they must be imbued with the desire to school themselves. The same thing applies to our noncommissioned officer corps. Here, the need for a Marine Corps level noncommissioned officer school becomes apparent. Aside from schooling, experience at lower levels of command should be a prerequisite for assignment to command duties. Admittedly, some of us might be penalized by such a requirement. There are 2 answers to this unfortunate condition. The readiness of the Marine Corps must come first. And there are many important and interesting fields within our service which provide an outlet for those who are so penalized. Naturally, there will always be some exceptions to the experience requirements but these must never become the rule.

Bureaucracy is a national disease which has come to affect the military as well as everybody else. In the military, bureaucracy emerges in excessive staff organization, staff procedures and staff power. It sometimes reaches the point where the first thing a commander thinks of



when he is assigned a mission is: "Where am I going to get the staff to do this?" The staff must be an aid, not a crutch. The cult of "bureaucratic" staff officers must be stifled. The idea that "any damn fool can be a commander but it takes brains to be a staff officer" must be exterminated. These are not exaggerations. The picture of an office bureaucrat enduring a quick tour as a battalion commander "just to get qualified" may well be upon us before long. At this point the commander could well become a robot dancing a minuet while the staff calls the tune with memoranda and mimeograph. S-3's will get together and complain about commanders who stick their noses into the business of operations and training. This last condition has occurred both in combat and without, and though infrequent, it is not a condition that strengthens command.

One cannot leave the difficulties of bureaucracy without a reflection on one of its byproducts—the cult of specialization. The tendency to elevate the specialist and lower the commander is a condition which has done much to damage our command structure. The picture of accelerated promotions and more pay for the so-called "technical specialists" has not been particularly comforting for those who aspire to command and it certainly cheapens command in the public eye. This can only be corrected by a forthright articulate emphasis on the fact that command requires more training, more work, more dedication, more general ability and more sacrifice than any other sphere of military endeavor. The specialists are necessary but they are reaching the point where they are the tail wagging the dog—a most unfortunate situation.

While instability, inexperience and bureaucracy can be controlled to a limited degree within a battalion or squadron, their root is an external one. The commander can fight these enemies of command with determined vigilance and ruthless action by exercising command in such a manner as to insure its proper stature and effectiveness.

The most important weapon that the battalion or squadron commander has to insure command effectiveness is command itself with all the authority that does, in fact, go with



it. The use of command requires certain sacrifices. It cannot be delegated. It must be personally exercised by the commander. It is a 24-hour-a-day job in war and peace. It demands active personal participation by the commander but not unnecessary interference or "squad leading." Be it the battlefield, the parade ground or a social affair, the commander must be there. Delegation of these responsibilities cannot be made. Failure of commanders to use properly the weapon of command has been manifest in such symptoms as "CP-itis" on the battlefield and absenteeism from peacetime unit activities. Inspections must involve battalion and squadron commanders personally. Staff visits, yes. Staff inspections, no.

Leadership is, of course, the most potent component of the command weapon. It is a subject with which Marine officers are all familiar and about which volumes have been written. It places tremendous demands upon the commander, but the rewards are immense. Proper exercise of leadership requires continuous study, self-analysis and practice. Most of us are aware of outstanding failures and successes in leadership. Propriety does not permit open discussion of the former except in unusual cases, yet the failures should be studied as carefully as the successes. There has always been a lot of discussion about the "lack of leadership among the junior officers and NCO's" but has there been much consideration by the battalion or squadron commander that he could possibly be at fault? Mere promotion in grade does not make an expert leader. Perhaps a cure for some of this leadership myopia at the battalion and squadron level would be devotion of some little time to the separate and distinct subject of command in our Senior and Junior Schools. As an aid to such study, perhaps a monograph composed of contributions by outstanding retired officers could be developed on the subject of Marine Corps leadership.

Allied with leadership are 2 other components of the command weapon—knowledge and experience and all the weight of authority that go with them. There is no substitute for knowledge of the right answer.

Again, maintenance of this command tool requires continuing and intensive effort. Knowledge of the various components of his unit by a commander requires prior study and experience as well as continual assimilation of new information. Thus, any commander who is so fortunate to have a battalion or squadron cannot expect to gain all the knowledge and experience necessary after he gets the assignment. Our schools can only expose an individual to a conspectus of the things he should know. The rest is up to him and to his superiors.

Consider now the principal fields which occupy the battalion or squadron commander in the day to day functioning of his unit—personnel, operations and/or training and administration in its broadest sense.

The fact that people are the most important element of a fighting force is sometimes lost sight of in these days of push button warfare, cost accounting and managerial efficiency. The mimeographed order



has been substituted for the personal contact. A Marine is becoming an MOS, not an individual. We see instances of officers and men alike being promoted without ceremony. Examples come to mind where a crusty commander will congratulate a new captain by calling him in and saying, "Jones, due to the rapid turnover of officers, Washington has seen fit to promote you and 400 others to the grade of captain. That is all." The form letter—whether it be for condolence or congratulation—has seeped into the area of personal relations with all of its impersonal and bureaucratic connotations.

How often are splendidly trained Basic School graduates lost through lack of personal attention and guidance by their first commander. The esprit and military tone of many a recruit loses luster through similar inattention. Large lines at Inspector General's request mast are a fre-

quent indication of lack of attention to the individual Marine. What causes these conditions? Have we entrusted personal responsibility of the commander for his individual Marines to a personnel officer and our administrative machine? Has a Marine become a number and not a person? In many cases the answer must be "yes." The tendency to centralize administration of Marines in a separate area, far from the company or even battalion commander tends to weaken command responsibility in the personnel field. The personnel officer becomes the commander to the individual Marine. The battery or company commander loses the immediate access to individual records so important to proper exercise of his responsibility to the individual. Frequently personnel officers put in proficiency markings. Recently, an application by a Marine for a career school was given the "by direction" treatment at company level! We must watch carefully for such "by direction" in the case of the individual. It tends to break down that important relationship stressed in those superb paragraphs of the Marine Corps Manual (Paras 4007, 4008, 4009). These difficulties in the personnel field can easily be eliminated through the proper use of the command tools in the hands of a battalion commander. He in turn should demand that his subordinates be so familiar with their troops that they can give a brief personal biography of every individual entrusted to their command. Proper command consideration of the individuals in a unit brings great dividends in esprit and combat readiness and at the same time it enhances the effectiveness of command.

The operation of a unit in combat and its training at other times demand the continued presence of command. The signing of an operation order or a training directive does not end the responsibility of the commander nor does it lessen the need for his personal supervision. The operations officer does not run the show. If he does, the commander reverts to a sort of constitutional monarch with no function except to show himself at parades or on proper social occasions. Combat readiness and success on the field of battle are the absolute require-

ments placed upon the Marine Corps and all its component elements. We can never lose sight of these 2 objectives regardless of the trees which surround us. Once a unit becomes accustomed to seeing a staff officer run the show, the cohesiveness of the command will ultimately cease to exist. When this happens, combat readiness and victory fall by the wayside. This does not mean that the commander must do everything himself. If he does, we have the anarchy of indecision through subordinate commands down to the last private Marine. Supervision must use the chain of command except in unusual cases. Staff officers must assist the commander and in turn be guided by him as they, too, are training for command.

Another aspect of operations and training which interferes with command is the tendency toward excess paperwork.

When the helicopter assault concept was undergoing its initial study, it was pointed out frequently that one of the fine things about helicopter operations was that there were only 2 commands—"Get in" and "Get out." The way things look now, it takes a few tons of paperwork to get to the point where those 2 commands may be issued.

While the complexity of amphibious operations is well-known, it should not take a thrice-copied set of operations orders to get a Marine battalion ashore. All too frequently, the efforts of a commander and his staff are devoted to planning schedules, exchange of staff memoranda, estimates, plans, orders, etc. As a result, active command participation is almost non-existent and the effectiveness of command is weakened.

The cure for these difficulties in the operations and training field appears relatively simple. Place emphasis on doing and let the writing go. Proper active command participation will eliminate many paper directives. The object is combat readiness and this includes command readiness. Paper evidence and paper effort mean little when the chips are down.

Administration in its broadest sense is probably the one area that gives the command concept and the commander his greatest trouble. Not only does it connote paperwork, it also brings to mind such things as

management, money, revolving funds and time study sheets. There is a tremendous tendency to consider the military as a business and to adopt business methods flavored with bureaucratic spice. While this fad will no doubt pass on, it can leave some pretty deep scars on our command structure. One can only note the significant leadership and personnel failures that besiege the business world and shudder at the effect of transplanting business management methods to the military. Regardless, the problem is with us. We must live with it, absorb the best and reject the rest. There is no reason for a battalion commander to envisage his unit as a little Department of Defense as he "improves" his administrative machinery. Simplicity must always be the command keynote. "Don't write it down; do it" would be a motto we could well adopt to eliminate excess paperwork. The administrative and technical channels which accompany each new fad of management must be carefully watched to see that they hew to the command line. Sooner or later, with persistent effort, people will gradually come to realize that commanders are endowed with common sense and ability and the new administrative fad will be recognized as a command function that has always existed. Of course there is not much hope for those who insist that command is a function of management rather than vice versa, but they are few and far between.

Administrative paperwork has been a *bete noir* of commanders ever since the day man learned to write. Like the weather, everybody talks about it and, in the military sense, writes about it. In doing so, we fall into another trap. If all the proposals and counter-proposals for reducing paperwork during the past 10 years were laid end to end the result would be staggering. Add to these the required studies and reports on paperwork and the distance would be quadrupled at the very least! Probably, there should be a law against making recommendations to reduce paperwork. Certainly at the battalion or squadron level, the commander can reduce internal paperwork at will. He can only hope for enlightenment in the higher echelons.

The big dangers which are posed

to command in the field of administration, particularly in peacetime, lie in the area of improper emphasis. Administration must be considered as subordinate to command and combat readiness. It is a tool and not an end. Undue emphasis on administration will tend to place the commanding officer in the light of an administrator rather than a commander. You do not administer a unit in battle.

While some poetic license may be apparent in this discussion, it is used to point out some of the difficulties which face the Marine Corps concept of command. There is no doubt that many of the things which tend to weaken the command concept will be with us for some time to come. Some are necessary and some are parasitic. Often, command can overcome these obstacles by placing them in a proper perspective and dealing with them as a new indication of the tremendous responsibility of command at any level.

Maintenance of the command concept must be a continuing effort for those in whose hands the security of the nation rests. On the lower levels, commanders must be prepared to make the sacrifices demanded of those who are privileged to command troops. While the burden of command is great, the rewards are greater and the stakes are battle victory and national security.

Perhaps commanders are not articulate enough about command. Why is it that we hear so much about management and administration and so little about command? The commander has much to offer the public in terms of experience and advice. If there is a void in public knowledge of the command concept, any crackpot idea has room to filter in and the result on the military can be further reduction in command stature and combat readiness or even national disaster. Thus the commander has a public responsibility added to all his others. This is particularly important in these days when new concepts of warfare are placing such tremendous emphasis on the responsibilities and initiative of commanders.

Command must be kept alive and strengthened if we are to have an effective military force. We, in the Marines, cannot neglect this warning.

US MC



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
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# THOR



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The very heavens shake with the thunder of some 135,000 horses as Thor streaks across the sky at 10 times the speed of sound. Designed by Douglas Aircraft to deliver total destruction to targets as far away as 1,500 miles, Thor represents the Air Force's

striking arm where ground objectives are concerned. For this surface-to-surface intermediate range ballistic missile, with its inertial guidance system, RCA has developed and is supplying electronic units to help Thor declare its mission: the prevention of war.



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**RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA**

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS

CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY

♣ Perpetuate, don't disintegrate! Too many young officers are getting out after their 3 years of Extended Active Duty. Whatever the cause, the effect is still the same.

Aren't you glad you're in? I am, and I know plenty of others who, in spite of their mumbles and groans, are filled to the brim with pride for their accomplishments and as grateful for their opportunities as you and I. Also, I know of many who aren't "In" and wish with all sincerity that they were. What of them? Do we ignore them and abandon them . . . "Except in case of National Emergency?"

Lament them, don't torment them. Give the officer who wants a "look-see" at the outside the same (maybe a little better) breaks we give the NCO who elects the

"greener pastures" only to find it a patch of bur-clover.

Because of a lack of background and want of experience, some made the fallible decision to try civilian life at the conclusion of 3 years EAD. During their short 3 years they saw very little of the varied and educational types of duty available to career officers. Actually, they saw little more than approximately 6 months of Quantico, 2 years of the FMF in one general area, and the remainder of their time was consumed by Proceed, Delay, and Travel accompanied by 30 days leave for each of the 3 years on active duty. After brief exposure to civilian opportunities and ample time to reflect on their decision, they should be provided with an opportunity to re-enter the regular

Marine Corps as a career officer.

A large potential of motivated, experienced, professional Marine officers are victims of limited regard. There is no current integration policy that would accommodate inactive Marine officers of company grade who have raised their sights after a tour in civilian life and have awakened to the merits of the Marine Corps career. Integration into the Regular Establishment is one of the 2 chief sources of gains to the officer population of the Marine Corps today. Further, it is valued by many Marines as an ultimate reward for loyal, competent, professional service to the Marine Corps. Yet, current programs limit integration opportunities to relatively few; i.e., generally the most junior, inexperienced (both in civilian life and in the mili-

## once a Marine ALWAYS A MARINE

By Maj Robert S. Geissinger



tary) officer personnel.

There will be in the future, as there is today, and as there has been in the past, an abeyant reserve of highly qualified officers who are products of Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, and who represent a considerable financial investment in terms of training, education and experience. These officers, in the vast majority of cases, are anxious for an opportunity and would be willing to re-enter the Marine Corps at an adjusted rank or lineal precedence, if only there were a program that would provide for them a degree of recognition commensurate with their active duty time and extent of Reserve participation.

Consider the fact that a Marine (officer or enlisted) who has been exposed to civilian life between tours in the Marine Corps and who returns to the Corps not as second choice, but by primary selection after personal experience in the so-called, "Greener Pastures", is in most instances a better Marine. And while still young enough in years to meet established criteria, he has become a more mature, a more experienced and a more accurately motivated Marine for his attainments on the outside. This is not to say that those who recognize the advantages early and make the immediate decision to stay in are not mature or without experience. It is rather in recognition of the established fact that not all individuals

are satisfied until the alternative has been tried. Some persons have to learn the hard way rather than benefit from the experiences of others.

By accepting a qualified ex-Marine, the Marine Corps would gain two-fold. The Corps would benefit economically by procuring applicants from this source of quiescent Marine Corps schooled and Marine Corps trained officers. In addition the Corps would benefit by elevated standards of capabilities and readiness by gaining these same school trained Marine officers of professional (military and civilian) background with a thorough understanding and appreciation of responsibilities and obligations to the Marine Corps. Reflect too, on the Corps' natural inheritance of the civilian education and professional background the individual absorbed while engaged in some specific civilian enterprise.

How to afford such officers the opportunities of integration and still perpetuate orderly promotions and equality of selection is the problem of immediate concern. This problem is not without solution. Of no less importance, and in direct relation to promotions and selections, is the requirement for the careful regulation of annual input to the officer population of the Marine Corps. The ideal program would reward, by favorable adjustment of lineal precedence, those officers who remain on continuous active duty.

And, it would invite for a limited period each year, inactive officers to participate in a competitive integration program for return to active duty. To accomodate this, there are 3 main considerations to be taken into account in the design of such a program: promotions, gains, losses.

1) Promotions are in direct relation to and dependent to a degree upon gains and losses. The major problem in the Regular officer promotion system today does not lie within the company grades. The "Hump," as it is affectionately referred to, appears in the grades of Col, LtCol and Maj. Legislation is currently before congress to resolve this problem.

2) Gains are a controllable factor dependent primarily upon officer procurement programs and programs of integration, influenced by the current economic and political climate. Gains to the Regular establishment in Fiscal Year 1957 totaled 522. Reserve appointments for the same period numbered 1,688. The breakdown of these figures is as follows:

Naval Academy Graduates	62
NROTC	199
ROTC	11
PLC	25
USMC (Band Officers)	3
Meritorious NCO's	29
LDO's	12
Total for Regular Officer Procurement	341


Augmented from Reserves to Regulars:

Basic School Graduates	144
Former NAVCAD	30
Reserve Officers (Other)	7
Total	181

Grand Total for Regular Input: 522

3) Losses by normal attrition, retirement, resignations, et al, are variable and, as gains, are influenced by the current economical and political climate. Total losses to the officer structure of the Marine Corps for Fiscal Year 1957 came to 2,964. These losses are attributed to the following:

Terminations	399
Severences	102







Normal Attrition	698
(Retirement)	
(Death)	
(Discharges)	
(Resignations)	
Reserve Releases	1765
Total Officer Losses:	2964

Numerically speaking, the weakest link in the chain of the officer population in the Marine Corps is in the rank of Capt. Nearly three-quarters (73.18 per cent) of the authorized officer strength of the Marine Corps is of company grade; Capts and Lts (49.85 per cent Lts and the remaining 23.33 per cent Capts). Compared to the *authorized* officer grade distribution indicated above, the *actual* grade distribution presents a different picture: As of July, 1957, the grade of Capt was roughly 10 per cent short of authorized strength, or only 22.55 per cent of the total population. The grade of Lt is so near the authorized strength that it varies but about one per cent from month to month. Majs and above are at authorized strength

and present no procurement problem.

Clearly then, the problem lies in the number of Capts within the officer population to maintain the equitable balance of grade distribution desired. Considering that the input of Lts is satisfactory and the procurement of new junior company grade officers may be advanced or retarded by manipulation of regulations or procurement methods and/or teams, the truly critical area lies within senior company grade officers. In amplification of this critical area an alarming percentage of Reserve officers, at the expiration of their 3 years of active duty, elect to be released to return to civilian life. The minority remain on active duty. And, currently, there is no program whereby the Reserve officer who has been out for about 6 or 8 months can return to the Marine Corps for a career.

To maintain a regulated input in any grade, present Marine Corps regulations require that Regular officers be procured in quantities nec-

essary to produce in each grade a series of numerically equal increments, each of which is composed of officers having the same amount of "commissioned service". The determination of amounts of commissioned service is dependent upon the original date of rank as related to graduation dates of the Naval Academy classes. Current policy states that officers who have a date of rank between 2 Naval Academy graduation classes, whether just after a given class of just before the next class one year later, are considered for integration purposes to have the same amount of commissioned service. For example: If graduation dates were 1 June 1956 and 7 June 1957, all Marine officers commissioned between 2 June 1956 and 7 June 1955 have the same amount of commissioned service.

Officers commissioned as indicated above are all in one "year-group." The "year-group" originates on the axiom above and is the subject of close surveillance for 4 years. Policy dictates that at the conclusion of the third year, the "year-group" must be built to its desired strength in order to maintain the orderly promotions and equality of selection mentioned earlier in this article. Normally this schedule would provide for 2 integration programs for one "year-group." However, the second program for one particular "year-group" may offer opportunities commensurate with existing vacancies within the rank of Lt only. It is at this point that a highly selective integration program for inactive Marine officers may be introduced in addition to the present programs. To facilitate such a program, minor administrative adjustments that require no legislation could be accomplished, such as modification of procurement quotas, anticipation of forced attrition and planning of future promotion flow, based on the acquisition of company grade officers from a reserve pool. The present program of offering the reward of Regular Commissions to individuals in the upper 5 per cent of a graduating class at Basic School should be continued. However, selectivity must be exercised perpetually. Unless this 5 per cent is highly motivated professionally, there should be no gra-



**Maj Geissinger** was commissioned in 1943. Following WWII he got out of the Marine Corps and remained out until 1950 when he returned for the Korean War. He was integrated into the regular Marine Corps in 1952 and since that time has served with the: 3d Amtrac Bn, 1st Phib Recon Co, and the 1st Marine Brigade. His present assignment is Assistant OIC, Recruiting Branch, Hqs, 8th MCRRD, New Orleans, La., with additional duties as coordinator of Officer Procurement activities.

tuitous issue of Regular Commissions merely by virtue of standing in the upper 1/20th of a below average class. At the same time, the inactive officer who has demonstrated a sincere interest in the Corps and is professionally qualified by continued Reserve participation should receive recognition above, and prior to, a completely indifferent inactive officer. The officer who continues his active duty uninterrupted by release will be rewarded by seniority and lineal precedence within his "year-group."

One program submitted herewith for consideration is to provide all officers upon commissioning with a 3 year conditional contract. One of two transactions may occur at the expiration of the third year: 1) Those who qualify may continue on active duty and integrate into the Regular establishment. Or, 2) they may elect to be released to inactive duty. If the officer desires to be released from EAD at the conclusion of the third year, provide a one-year Leave-of-Absence with an opportunity to re-enter the Marine Corps prior to the expiration of the fourth year. The acceptance of the one year Leave-of-Absence would include the understanding and agreement to a proportionate loss of lineal precedence sufficient to place the individual at the top of the subsequent "year-group." Those who would elect to continue Regular active service at the conclusion of the third year and are qualified in other respects, would receive permanent rank as a Regular officer and would thus be rewarded by corresponding lineal seniority. By such a program the individual who "stays" would remain within the "year-group" in which he was originally placed, while the one who elects to go "out" reverts to the top of the following "year-group" so as to never interfere with the normal promotion flow of the original "year-group" and his running mates. In addition, a requirement for the individual to make a declaration of intent 6 or 8 months after release is incorporated into the program to assure a more accurate estimate of losses or gains to the officer population with respect to "year-groups" involved.

For example: Two officers with

the same date of rank as 2nd Lts serve the normal tour of 3 years EAD. At the end of the third year each is equal in all respects. Neither has had more of civilian life than high school or college provides. However, one recognizes the Corps as his profession and qualifies, applies and is accepted for integration. The other is not certain and wants to see what it's like on the outside. One, "A" stays in and is granted a Regular Commission. The other, "B" takes Leave-of-Absence with his rank and lineal position becoming static until receipt of his declaration of intent. Within a specific period of time, a declaration of intent by "B" to return to active duty prior to the expiration of the one year Leave-of-Absence is initiated. At the same time a request for integration into the Regular Marine Corps is forwarded to HQMC. "B" returns to active duty with an adjusted date of rank and lineal precedence junior



to "A" within the "year-group" subsequent to that of "A". If no declaration of intent is made within the prescribed time, and/or the individual indicates a negative response at any time during the Leave-of-Absence, his right to re-instatement into the Regular establishment is forfeited without reservation or future opportunities for return to EAD.

A second program submitted herewith for consideration is in supplementation of the current program of commissioning in the Marine Corps Reserve for 3 years EAD. Six months after an individual has been released from active duty, correspondence initiated by HQMC will advise the individual of the limited, highly competitive integration opportunities that are available to only those officers recently released. Ap-

plications for re-entry and integration will be accepted only during the last 6 months, and prior to the anniversary date of the first year of the officer's release. Opportunities for return to active duty and integration will expire (no waivers) within 12 months after release from 3 years EAD. As in the first proposal, this program recognizes the time requirements with respect to "year-groups" and the need for a stable base to the officer population. This program too, will reward the officer who elects to remain on active duty and integrate into the Regular establishment, by lineal seniority over those officers who elect to be released to inactive duty and then return. By the same token, both programs designed not to penalize the junior officer who is undecided as to an ultimate goal, but rather to compensate for his experience and education by providing an opportunity to integrate into the Regular establishment.

These 2 proposed programs of integration are submitted as a possible solution to a critical and costly officer procurement situation that threatens the Regular officer population of company grade Marine officers today. They are designed to restore the shortage of senior company grade officers in the FMF as well as other billets throughout the Marine Corps. Neither of the 2 programs is designed to absorb Reserve officers of years gone by, nor are they intended as a sagacious cure-all. They are offered to generate an interest and concern for the present and future officer structure of the Marine Corps, with the hope that the large number of senior company grade experienced Marine Officers who will be released and become dormant are recognized as an unlimited wealth of prospects for the Regular establishment.

In terms of readiness, economics, and professional capabilities, the Marine Corps would benefit from a program whereby company grade officers who have been "out" for less than a year and who are otherwise qualified in all respects may, upon approval of written request, return to active duty and compete in an integration program for a career in the United States Marine Corps.

USMC

# *Launch the Runway*



✿ COMBAT AIRFIELDS COME IN ALL sizes, shapes and construction features, with each one appearing to be different—in varying degrees—from all the others. Nevertheless, despite their apparent dissimilarity, all of them are identical in one respect. They are a nuisance.

I am not merely referring to the civilian concept of airport nuisances such as excessive noise, television reception interference, and real or imagined danger of falling aircraft.

The trouble and concern airfields cause the military commander—especially the amphibious commander—go far beyond these annoyances.

Because the amphibious attack commander seldom owns or controls adequate airfields adjacent to his objective prior to the operation, obviously he must seize and rehabilitate existing airfields or capture suitable terrain upon which to build them. In either case, considerable combat and support manpower is expended



PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST

MARINE CORPS  
ION

HONOR

P I


and precious shipping space is allocated for engineering equipment.

Then, after the airfields are acquired in one of these ways, the commander is stuck with fixed geographic points to defend when complete mobility is the basic principle of combat operations on the atomic battlefield of today.

Furthermore, the ironic part of the situation is that airfields do not directly provide any combat capability whatsoever. Support aircraft, once

they leave the combat airfields, are a potent element of the amphibious commander's combat force; but the airfields themselves are strictly in the category of noncombatants and are millstones around the commander's neck. The paradox therefore exists of the commander paying a tremendous price for something he would rather not have.

Now, however, because of recent developments in aeronautical technology, there may be a possibility of



**B-47 shortens take-off distance with JATO**

removing all or part of the burden of combat airfields while still retaining the air support capability which is so essential to successful combat operations. A great deal of thought has already been devoted to this problem and a considerable amount of work and money is currently going into various means of solving it. However, there is one possible solution to the problem of "airfieldless air support" which, although it appears to have considerable merit, is not currently receiving active developmental effort. For lack of a better term, we will call it the Airborne Launch/Retriever System.

Before we examine this system, however, perhaps we should set the stage by looking at some systems already in existence or under development. Throughout this discussion we must keep in mind that we are not trying to arrive at a means of doing away with LaGuardia Field, Chicago Midway Airport or Washington National Airport. We are merely concerned with the best way of launching and retrieving support aircraft in the combat zone, with emphasis on the early stages of an amphibious operation.

When considered in this light, our previous ideas regarding what is "conventional" and which is the most economical method of operation, must undergo some modification.

One way to approach the problem is with specialized aircraft requiring little or no ground operating installations. Military planners have given consideration to this concept for a number of years.

During WWII, the US Navy started the ball rolling when they became interested in the development of a "convoy fighter" (i.e., a fighter aircraft capable of operating from the minimum deck space available on merchant-type ships). In other words, it would have to be a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. The advent of shaft turbine engines with high horsepower/weight ratio, made development of such an aircraft entirely feasible and the Convair XFY-1 "Pogo Stick" and Lockheed XFV-1 grew out of this idea.

Both of the above aircraft proved

successful in flight but were obsolete for their intended function by the time they were built. Being propeller-driven, they did not have the forward speed required of present-day fighter aircraft. The next logical step, therefore, was development of a jet-propelled VTOL aircraft.

The Ryan J-13 "Vertijet" made the world's first known jet VTOL transition flight from vertical take-off to forward cruising flight and back to a vertical landing in April 1957.

We will get back to the characteristics and features of high-speed VTOL aircraft later, when we compare them with the Airborne Launch/Retriever System.

Besides VTOL aircraft, there is still another possibility: take-off and landing assist devices for more conventional aircraft. It should be noted in the beginning, however, that use of these assist devices does not do away with airfields completely. Since they merely decrease required runway size, none of them is entirely satisfactory for the purpose under consideration.

A device which has been in existence for quite some time now is JATO (Jet Assist for Take-off). A JATO unit is a rocket motor resembling an oversize CO<sub>2</sub> cartridge for seltzer water bottles and has a self-contained fuel supply. It is attached to the aircraft and is used during the take-off run to provide additional thrust in order to decrease take-off distance. The unit can be jettisoned after take-off to save weight.

JATO, of course, does not help in decreasing landing distance, so some aircraft are equipped with "drogue chutes" for landing. The drogue chute is attached to the tail of the aircraft and is billowed when the wheels touch the ground to create drag, thereby decreasing landing roll-out.

Another system which falls under the category of take-off and landing assistance for the more conventional-type aircraft is land-based catapult and arresting gear similar to that employed aboard aircraft carriers.

The principle of the catapult is to accelerate aircraft faster than would be possible if the aircraft engine was the sole source of the thrust, thereby



**Maj Clapp** enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1940 and was commissioned in 1943. He has served as a pilot in fighter, attack and helicopter squadrons. In 1954-'56 he was Helicopter Operations Officer, Tactics and Techniques Board, MCLFDC, Quantico, Va. He is presently serving as Assistant Secretary of the General Staff, HQMC, and wrote this essay because "I am convinced this system is such a logical step in the adaptation of the helicopter to help solve difficult problems that sooner or later someone somewhere will try it."

decreasing take-off ground run. Catapults are driven by steam, compressed air or mechanical force transmitted through cables from an engine.

The arresting gear system consists of a series of cables—stretched laterally across the runway—which are attached to retarding devices such as hydraulic or pneumatic cylinders. A hook is attached to the underside of the aircraft for engagement with the cross-runway cables soon after the aircraft wheels touch the ground. The retarding device then takes over and decelerates the aircraft to a complete stop.

The next system to be described is the Airborne Launch/Retriever System. The principle of the system is to launch and retrieve combat support aircraft with helicopters. The operational application of this system is to have the support aircraft widely dispersed ashore. The helicopters then go to the dispersal sites and hover over the combat aircraft, pick them up, move into forward flight and simultaneously gain altitude. When the helicopters reach forward velocity in excess of stalling speed of the combat aircraft, the combat aircraft are released to commence their support mission. Upon completion of the mission, the support aircraft return to the vicinity of the dispersal sites where helicopters are in cruising flight at a safe altitude for the retrieving operation, which consists of the aircraft coming in underneath the helicopter and hooking onto the retrieving device. The helicopters then descend and land the aircraft on the spot where they are to be reserviced and re-armed.

At first glance, this undoubtedly appears to be a scheme from the pen of Jules Verne; but after examining it in a little more detail, I believe you will agree that it is nothing more nor less than a straight-forward and logical development of existing hardware and operating practices.

When the author began giving serious thought to this concept he was able to check the validity of his views by discussing them with the foremost rotary wing aircraft authority in this country (probably in the entire world), Mr. Igor I. Sikorsky. Then, after the concept was set forth on paper, Mr. Sikorsky generously



**Convair XFV-1 "Pogo Stick"**

took the time to read it and make the following observations:

"... I believe that the scheme is not only entirely feasible but that it will offer valuable advantages and is therefore well worth serious further study.

"The main advantage is, first of all, its total independence from airports or carrier decks, thus allowing launching from any spot from which a crane helicopter can be operated, as well as providing excellent opportunity for dispersion and consequently excellent protection for aircraft on the ground, from enemy bomber attack.

"The second great advantage is that the aircraft designed for such launching can have higher performance and/or higher maneuverability and/or greater armament, as compared with an airplane of similar size and power, which carries provisions for taking off under its own power from a runway.

"It may be added that launching represents the simplest and safest way of getting a high speed airplane in the air. It is not merely possible but very simple and very easy.

"Concerning the retrieving of fixed wing aircraft, I am convinced that this is also possible even though further details and techniques of this operation should be studied and, in due time, confirmed by tests. ..."

Sometimes, even though a concept is as feasible in principle as this one, the development of hardware creates problems which are too difficult to overcome to make the undertaking worthwhile. Fortunately, this is not

so in this case for the simple reason that this system merely entails the combining of several seemingly unrelated devices which individually have been proved feasible. It should be relatively inexpensive, moreover, to combine these devices and test the feasibility of the system as a whole.

First of all, the system requires a helicopter capable of transporting combat-type aircraft at speeds in excess of the stalling speed of the combat aircraft.

The next element of the system is a high-performance combat aircraft with extremely lightweight construction.

The third element of the system is a device installed on the helicopter to permit launching and retrieving aircraft.

Now perhaps we should take a fairly close look at existing hardware typifying the 3 elements of the Airborne Launch/Retriever System; not that use of these specific pieces of equipment is advocated, but merely to point out certain performance characteristics which have already been demonstrated.

First, we will consider the helicopter. A helicopter to do the job I have in mind should be on the order of a 5-ton payload machine, which is entirely reasonable with the current state-of-the-art in helicopter technology. In fact, the Sikorsky HR2S, with some modification, may be able to handle this job on an interim basis.

The next characteristic the helicopter must have is a reasonable cruising speed in relation to the stalling speed of the combat-type





**HR2S — possible element of the Airborne Launch/Retriever System**

aircraft. Since most jet combat aircraft have an approach speed in the neighborhood of 120 knots, a helicopter speed of approximately 140 knots should give enough margin for safe operation.

There again, that is not an unreasonable characteristic to expect of a helicopter developed for this purpose, inasmuch as the HR2S has already demonstrated its ability to fly in excess of this speed.

Let us now examine a lightweight combat aircraft, the British Folland Gnat, to see what can be done in designing a combat aircraft when miniaturization is the keynote. The Gnat weighs 8,200 pounds fully loaded and has an engine rated at 6,000 pounds thrust with afterburning. It has an approximate maximum speed of 630 knots and an initial climb rate of 15,000 feet per minute. The Gnat is armed with two 30 mm cannons and can carry

either two 500-pound bombs or twelve 3-inch rockets.

The last element of the system, the launch and retrieving rig, has been in use for a number of years, so no problem whatsoever exists in this area. Back in the 1930s such a rig was installed on US Navy dirigibles and was later modified for installation on the B-29 to carry escort fighters. The rig developed for the B-29 would probably have to be modified to a certain extent for this application, but should entail no more than a very minor engineering development.

Another feature of this system which should not be overlooked in this day of rising costs and diminishing return budgets is that it would be relatively inexpensive to test its feasibility. The Sikorsky HR2S is currently in service and can carry approximately 6,000 pounds of payload for short distances. It should


not be too difficult to obtain one of the rigs designed for use on the B-29 to install on one of these HR2Ss. An aircraft similar to the Cessna T-37-A jet trainer which has a stall speed in the neighborhood of 75 knots and a loaded weight of approximately 5,500 pounds, could be used as the aircraft to be launched and retrieved in the air.

The next question which should be tackled is, "How does this system compare with the systems either in existence or under development?"

In order to draw a comparison between the Airborne Launch/Retriever System and high speed VTOL aircraft, it will be necessary to digress a bit at this point and see what factors come into play when an aircraft is designed to take off and land vertically.

In order to take off vertically an aircraft's power plant must develop thrust slightly in excess of the aircraft weight. This is just another way of stating Newton's Third Law of Motion, "An action will create an equal and opposite reaction." Therefore, if an aircraft weighs 10,000 lbs and its power plant is capable of producing 10,000 pounds of thrust, it will be able to hover; if the power plant produces more than 10,000 pounds of thrust, it also can climb vertically.

In theory, it makes no difference what type power plant is used — reciprocating engine with propeller, shaft turbine engine with propeller, or jet turbine — just as long as it produces enough thrust. The relative merits of the different power plants, insofar as VTO application is concerned, have to do with:



**British "Gnat" — ultra-lightweight combat aircraft**

1) The difference in power required for the same amount of thrust because of the difference in static thrust efficiency of propellers and jet air columns.

2) The difference in engine horsepower/weight ratio of the different type engines.

3) Difference in specific fuel consumption of the different engines (pounds of fuel per horsepower per hour).

The chart below gives the estimated characteristics of hypothetical power plants capable of providing 1,000 pounds of static thrust.


From the data in this table we can make several broad observations regarding the relative merits of these propulsion systems for VTOL combat aircraft.

First of all, strictly from a power required standpoint, it is better to use an engine with a propeller rather than a straight jet because of its greater static thrust efficiency. Then, from the standpoint of combined weight of the engine and fuel, it is better to use a shaft turbine with propeller rather than a reciprocating engine with propeller.

It should be noted, however, that an aircraft equipped with propellers would have an estimated maximum speed of 350-400 knots, which is rather slow for a combat aircraft in this day and age. It may be necessary, therefore, to go ahead and use the jet engine, even though it is less efficient for VTOL operation, in order to achieve a more reasonable



**B-29 equipped with launching and retrieving gear**



**T-37 jet trainer could be used for testing new system**

POWER PLANT TYPE	POWER REQUIRED	ENGINE WEIGHT	FUEL CONSUMPTION PER HOUR (100% POWER)
RECIPROCATING/ PROPELLER	500 HORSEPOWER	500 POUNDS	250 POUNDS
SHAFT TURBINE/ PROPELLER	500 HORSEPOWER	275 POUNDS	325 POUNDS
JET TURBINE	1,000 POUNDS THRUST	400 POUNDS	950 POUNDS

amount of speed for combat operation.

Regardless of the type of power plant ultimately selected, and whether the VTOL aircraft is designed to take off and land with the fuselage in the vertical or horizontal attitude, there is a problem of control at low speeds up until the aircraft reaches sufficient forward speed for the conventional flight controls to take effect.

Furthermore, an outstanding operational problem of all types of VTOL aircraft is the terrific down-blast of the propulsion system during take-off and landing. In unprepared areas, the least that will happen is that the aircraft will blow sand and kick debris around. In the case of jet VTOL aircraft, with its down blast of air running some 700 degrees Centigrade and 700 knots velocity, it is necessary to have a metal baffle plate on the ground at the take-off/landing site to keep the aircraft from digging a hole in the ground.

Another operational problem with aircraft which take off and land with their fuselage in the vertical plane—the so-called "Tail Sitters"—is that the pilot must execute landings while looking back over his shoulder. Since highly qualified test pilots are the only pilots who have performed this maneuver so far, we do not know how much of a training problem will exist if run-of-the-mill pilots are called upon to do it.

While an aircraft whose fuselage remains horizontal during take-off and landing should not pose much of a pilot training problem, it does have the mechanical complexity of pivoting engines or deflecting the slipstream in some other manner.

Now that there is a degree of familiarity with them, we can determine how VTOL combat aircraft stack up against the Airborne Launch/Retriever System.

So as not to be in the position of trying to compare apples with oranges, we will assume that both combat aircraft types, those capable of vertical take-off from the ground and those launched in the air, are powered with jet engines so that they will have comparable combat performance. The adjacent chart gives a rough comparison of 2 jet-engine propelled aircraft, one capable

	VTOL	AIR LAUNCH/ RETRIEVE
GROSS WEIGHT	10,000 LBS	10,000 LBS
AIRFRAME WEIGHT	3,000 LBS	3,000 LBS
CREW AND EQUIPMENT WEIGHT	700 LBS	700 LBS
MAXIMUM SPEED	700+ KTS	700+ KTS
POWER REQUIRED	10,000 LBS THRUST	5,000 LBS THRUST
ENGINE WEIGHT	4,000 LBS	2,000 LBS
FUEL & PAYLOAD	2,300 LBS	4,300 LBS
FLIGHT DURATION* (NO ARMAMENT)	10 MIN	60 MIN
FLIGHT DURATION* (1,000 LBS ARMAMENT)	5 MIN	45 MIN
*100 PER CENT POWER FOR 5 MINUTES FOR TAKE-OFF & LANDING, 80 PER CENT POWER REMAINDER OF TIME.		




of VTOL operation and the other designed to be launched and retrieved in the air. Neither of them require conventional landing gear, so considerable airframe weight-saving can be expected in relation to the weight of entirely conventional aircraft. It is further assumed that the weight of auxiliary control devices for minimum ground speed operation of the VTOL aircraft will nearly equal the weight of the wing flap system on the other aircraft.

It is readily apparent which aircraft is superior for this gross weight. For larger aircraft, however, the scales would definitely shift toward the VTOL, inasmuch as it would be infeasible to air-launch a very much larger aircraft and certain "economies-of-scale" would result from enlarging the VTOL aircraft. Nevertheless, larger size means greater cost, generally speaking, and it also means increased maintenance requirements.

Then, after the aircraft are built, there are certain operational considerations to reckon with.

We have noted that the downblast of the propulsion system of jet VTOL aircraft is intensive enough to start a dust storm, at the least, and might even dig a hole large enough for the aircraft to fall into if metal baffle plates are not used. This problem, of course, does not exist to the same degree when aircraft are launched in the air. It is true that the helicopter rotor will raise dust and blow debris around while it is picking-up and landing the aircraft, but the problem is less



severe than it is with jet VTOL aircraft.

Furthermore, if the VTOL is of the "Tail-Sitter" variety, there will be a problem of pilot indoctrination which may or may not be rather extensive. However, if the VTOL characteristics are obtained by deflecting the thrust downward while the fuselage remains horizontal, there should be little or no special training problems. With the Airborne Launch/Retriever System, the launch part requires absolutely no technique on the part of the combat aircraft pilot and the retrieving part

should be no more difficult than an air-to-air refueling operation or an aircraft carrier landing. Both of these operations, of course, take place every day around the clock.

Last, but by no means least in this day of minimum budgets, is the matter of cost. Aircraft costs, generally speaking, are a function of the aircraft empty weight for similar type aircraft. Engine cost per pound is one of the most expensive parts of the aircraft. This cost/size price ratio, holds true even after aircraft have gone through the developmental stage and are in production. The



*B-47 shortens landing run with "drogue chute"*

developmental cost of jet VTOL aircraft, if we are to judge by past experience, will be remarkably expensive. However, in the case of the aircraft to be launched and retrieved in the air, it is visualized that it would be conventional in all respects and would therefore require little or no special developmental effort. Since we would expect jet VTOL to be larger and heavier than the air launched and retrieved aircraft, we could therefore expect it to be quite a bit more expensive even in the production stage. There would, of course, be some cost related to the

helicopter but its usefulness after it is developed would not be restricted to this particular task.

When comparing the Airborne Launch/Retriever System with other systems designed to assist conventional aircraft in take-off and landing, the first obvious fact is that the latter require some sort of airfield, even though it may be a miniature one. However, the aircraft to be launched and retrieved by helicopters can be scattered in small numbers all over the countryside at any place where ground troops can provide security for them.

Furthermore, JATO units, catapults and arresting gear pose a logistics problem, especially in the early "carry-everything-on-your-back" phase of an amphibious operation. This is not to say that there would be no logistics problems with the Airborne Launch/Retriever System, but in this case the system in itself is mobile and will therefore require no special transportation effort from ship-to-shore. In fact, the helicopter part of the system can even ease some of the logistics problems by moving a sizeable fuel supply ashore for themselves and the combat aircraft, prior to the time that the aircraft units are staged ashore from the ships.

Another advantage of the Airborne Launch/Retriever System is in the field of aircraft maintenance. With any other system, aircraft which are out of commission must be repaired on the spot where they stand, which may make working conditions somewhat less than optimum, or they must be transported overland to a central repair facility. When the Airborne Launch/Retriever System is utilized, however, these aircraft can be transported to the maintenance facility by helicopter.

Here is a system, therefore, which may relieve some of the amphibious commander's airfield headaches with no sacrifice in quantity or quality of the air support he receives. It should not be assumed that it is a "cure-all" or that it can be delivered tomorrow free of charge, with no unsolved problems attached. It does, however, have sufficient potential to warrant test and evaluation. Then, and only then, the Airborne Launch/Retriever System can be branded a bust or a bargain.

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### Honesty Is the Best Policy

A MOTOR TRANSPORT company at Camp Pendleton was having a "junk on the bunk" inspection during an IG inspection.

The Colonel commanding the team walked slowly down the passageway. Suddenly he stopped before a bunk which obviously was without the minimum clothing required.

"Where are the rest of your clothes?" the Colonel sternly asked the Corporal standing before the display.

"They're being laundered, Sir," was the timid reply.

"Well then, why don't you display your laundry slip?"

The Corporal looked a bit sheepish, but remembering honesty is the best policy replied, "Sir, I'm afraid my wife didn't give me one."

1st Lt C. R. Venditto



**SKYHOOK, RESCUE, MARINES...** This horsecollar is a beautiful sight to a leatherneck who is floating around in the briny, or waiting rescue from the boondocks. It's a welcome sight especially because he knows there's a Marine Corps chopper on the other end. Having a rescue helicopter around is SOP with the Marines, and many a pilot has come back to fly again because the Corps takes such care of its own. Kaman helicopters have never graced Montezuma's halls, but they've been almost everywhere else... with the Marines.

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## IN BRIEF

☛ *The Marine Corps Association sword* was presented to 2dLt Peter J. Johansen, the honor graduate of 3-57 Basic Class, by LtGen M. B. Twining, Commandant Marine Corps Schools, and Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr.



Lt Johansen received his commission through the Meritorious Non-Commissioned Officer Program. He has been assigned to duty with the 2d MarDiv, Camp Lejeune, N. C.

While serving as an enlisted man in Korea, Lt Johansen was awarded the Silver Star Medal.

☛ *The reorganization of the entire combat structure of the Marine Corps* is now entering its final phase and will be completed by 30 September 1958.

The streamlining program embraces all of the Corps' FMF units—3 divisions, 3 aircraft wings, and combat support elements.

Basically, the reorganization involves creation of lighter, faster, more mobile combat units organized and equipped to conduct modern amphibious operations, including vertical assault by helicopter, under conditions of either nuclear or non-nuclear war.

The Commandant has ordered reorganization to be accomplished between 1 April and 30 September for the 2d MarDiv; the 3d MarDiv; the 2d MAW; the 1st MAW and the 1st MarBrig.

Reorganization of the 1st MarDiv and the 3d MAW was completed 30 June 1957.

☛ *All US weapons and related equipment* are to be converted to the use of the meter for measurement of linear distances. This is being done to establish a common unit of measurement in connection with the operation of US weapons, to facilitate standardization within NATO, and to permit better and more extensive use of allied and captured material.

This change does not include the use of the metric system in measuring weights and fluids, and does not change the units of measurement used for expressing meteorological data.

The conversion is to be accomplished over a 10-year period and will be fully implemented by 1 Jan 1966.

☛ *The new Navy Helicopter, Bell HTL-7 integrated instrument trainer*, rolled off the assembly lines and immediately went into flight testing. The Navy will use HTL-7's for both basic and instrument helicopter pilot training.

An instrument system similar to the one designed for the HTL-7 is being operationally tested in 2 Bell HUL-1 helicopters assigned to the Navy's IGY Deepfreeze III operation in the Antarctic.



The new helicopter follows the design lines of the Navy's utility model HUL-1 with the exception of the cabin, which features dual controls and side-by-side seating for the student and the instructor.

☛ *Sperry Gyroscope Co. announced details of a new 3-dimensional "space speedometer,"* comparable in scientific value to the super-accurate modern gyroscopes for future US aircraft, winged missiles and atomic submarines.

The new device is a 1½-pound, ultra-sensitive "accelerometer"—the companion instrument with gyroscopes to feed signals to a miniature computer for jam-proof Inertial Guidance systems, where immunity to enemy detection or interference is desired.

Newest accelerometers when teamed with gyros on various axes, microscopically detect and measure exact velocity in any direction of spherical space.

☛ *A new type of boom truck*, the "Hydro-Boom," is now being produced by Vanguard Engineering Co.




The operator can, by telescopic action, position work loads with machine tool accuracy to within 1/100 of an inch in vertical, longitudinal, and cross-wise directions of travel. The vertical and longitudinal travel is operated hydraulically and the cross-wise travel is mechanically operated. The hook reaches up to 48" beyond the front end of the truck, keeping the truck away from the area to be serviced.

☛ *A helicopter believed to be the most heavily armed aircraft of its type in the free world* is being tested at Fort Benning, Ga.

The armed helicopter mounts forty 2.75-inch rockets, two 5-inch rockets, 9 machine guns and two 20mm cannons on a H-34 Choctaw.

The rockets are mounted on the bottom and on the sides of the helicopter, aimed forward. The machine guns are located along the sides and on the front of the aircraft.

The armed helicopter is being tested for possible use in patrol and reconnaissance missions.



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
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As a military aeromedical/passenger/light cargo transport, the prop-jet Electra CL-355 is capable of introducing a new era of passenger safety, performance flexibility and operational economy to the Military Air Transport Service.







# HIGH S

☛ The Navy's new P6M SeaMaster is the first of 24 minelaying seaplanes under construction. The plane can refuel from a submarine and deliver mines or nuclear weapons against any target 2,000 or more miles away.

Able to cruise normally at 40,000 feet with a payload of 30,000 pounds, the 600 mph P6M marks a significant advance in the development of a major new anti-submarine warfare striking weapon.

The Navy can disperse small units of the P6Ms widely, some of them in areas where larger forces cannot be kept. Their mobile bases would operate well out of range of surprise attack.


As a result of the loss of 2 prototype XP6M-1 aircraft, the new SeaMaster carries a redesign of the hydraulic control system. The new plane is the first of 6 to be powered by 4 Allison J-71 turbojet engines with take-off afterburners. The 18 additional planes are to be powered by 4 Pratt & Whitney J-75 turbojet engines.





# **H SPEED MINELAYER**

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# INTRAMURAL

By 1stLt John W. Chinner

A great form of recreation from wh

IN SPITE OF THE A-BOMB, THE H-bomb and probable future X, Y, and Z-bombs, it is still the man with the rifle that makes the difference between winning and losing wars. Not just men with rifles, but men with confidence in their rifles and in their ability to use them. Directives from the Commandant have encouraged marksmanship programs and competition-in-arms. In addition, various people have suggested ways and means of improving our skill with the rifle. It's the same old story, many think it is a great idea but few are willing to work at it. At FMF Pac in 1955, someone did work at it and the results were impressive. Interest in shooting increased tremendously and the outcome was not only more and better shooters but proof that intramural rifle and pistol matches will work. They are well

worth the time and effort put into them. Here is the solution — Intramural High-power Rifle and Pistol Competition. For years intramural sports have included football, baseball, tennis, etc., but seldom big-bore shooting. Now, at long last the big step had been taken.

The Commanding General, FMF Pac issued instructions establishing an intra-unit rifle and pistol competition program. The plan called for intramural competition to establish organizational teams and for these teams to compete in bi-monthly intra-unit matches. Winning teams from the Windward and Leeward Leagues were to hold a shoot-off at the end of each quarter with a perpetual trophy going to the Island champs. Since the program was designed to develop new shooters, Distinguished Marksmen were barred

from competition but were encouraged to act as team coaches. This is an important feature of such a program because it eliminates the distinguished shooter yet gives the tyro an opportunity to pick up experience and to take advantage of association with men who have proved their ability. Several Distinguished Marksmen on the firing line coach the younger men.

From the beginning, there was no question as to interest. Units jumped at the chance to compete — COs were enthusiastic, even eager, and their troops worked hard on their own time to practice and improve. The schedule was arranged so that all practice shooting was restricted to Wednesday and Thursday afternoons and all matches were held on Saturday mornings. A similar program was set up for pistol competi-



# L SHOOTING

from which all Marines can profit

tion with the exception that all matches were fired on Wednesday afternoons. Now anyone having served in a guard unit will realize that men standing "day on—day off" duty with alternating weekends simply do not spend their off duty hours on a rifle range; yet five of the ten teams in the Leeward League were from such units and nearly all of their shooting took place on their "off day." Firing every other weekend meant no Saturdays and only alternate Sundays to go on liberty. So it would seem that shooting in the Marine Corps is not so much a matter of interest and desire as it is of opportunity.

The first intra-unit match was a surprise to everyone, in that there was very little confusion and the eagerness of the shooters more than made up for their mistakes. It should

be remembered, that other than re-qualification, few of these men had ever fired in competition; practically none had any experience shooting with a team; weapons were not match conditioned. First place team honors in that match were won with a score of 856 x 1000, while the low team fired a 745 x 1000. A score of 228 x 250 was high individual and 173 x 250 was low. In the final match of the quarter the winning team fired an 857 with an 830 being low and the individuals ranged from 228 to 196, high and low respectively. Although the better shooters' scores remained about constant the lower shooters all showed great improvement, and since the purpose of the program was to develop "hidden talent" and stimulate interest, the first quarter intramural rifle competition appears to have been quite a

success. In the shoot-off between the two leagues the winning team scored 918. A 215 (individual) placed fifth in our first match but 230 showed up away down in eighth place in the shoot-off.

In the pistol competition a little difficulty was encountered by the units fielding teams in that very few men felt they had the ability to fire match scores with the pistol. Once again, though, command encouragement paid off and each unit managed to enter at least one team. During the quarterly matches, one team stayed in the lead all the way and turned in a winning score of 3862 x 4800. The cellar spot dropped to 1682 x 4800. However, the wide range in scores also means a wide range for improvement and, as stated, this is the purpose of intramural shooting.

Intramural high-power rifle and pistol shooting is certainly a desirable form of competition between Marine units and as this program proved, when given opportunity and encouragement Marines will shoot. They will shoot on their own time and for no reward other than personal satisfaction and the esteem that goes with being a good man with a weapon. They will shoot simply because that is what a Marine has to do best. So it is really up to us. We can limit the shooting to re-qualification and continue to get ordinary results, or we can give Marines an intramural program, plenty of encouragement and let 'em shoot.

US MC






# AMPHIBIOUS



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# DOUBLEHEADER



Two victories in May of 1813 gave a start to three American military leaders who set traditions for their country's armed forces throughout the next four decades

By Lynn Montross

COINCIDENCE WAS HARD AT WORK on a May morning in 1813 when both opposing forces launched amphibious assaults at opposite ends of Lake Ontario without either being aware that the other was similarly engaged. While the American squadron landed troops to attack Fort George, a British post near the mouth of the Niagara river, the British squadron was carrying out a like operation against Sackett's Harbor, an American naval base some 150 miles to the east.

One of these attempts succeeded brilliantly. The other failed with heavy losses. In each instance the margin between victory and defeat

was exactly the difference between the observance and violation of principles of amphibious warfare which are fundamental in every age.

From start to finish, the War of 1812 abounded in extremes. Some of the most humiliating flights and surrenders of our military annals were recorded along with some of the bravest fights and stoutest stands. By the same token, the strategy and tactics of the unprepared American forces ranged all the way from good to horrid.

Ever since the earliest explorations, inland waterways had been the highroads of commerce as well as strategy along the Canadian frontier.





*Perry at the battle of Lake Erie*

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The St. Lawrence and Great Lakes linked the Atlantic seaboard with the West, while Lake Champlain and the Richelieu and Hudson rivers provided a route southward from the heart of Canada to the centers of American population.

The letters MSR meant nothing to bright young American officers in 1813, but they realized that the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario were the main supply route of the British defenders of Upper Canada, better known today as the Province of Ontario. If this lifeline could be cut, all Canada west of the great river would wither on the logistical vine.

Sackett's Harbor gave the Americans a naval base only about 35 miles from the bottleneck where Lake Ontario finds an outlet in the St. Lawrence. In order to guard this junction of the lake and river, the British enlarged their naval base at Kingston.

Adze and saw were the weapons at first as the struggle for control of Lake Ontario took the form of a ship-building race with green lumber. This sort of bloodless contest just suited the rival fresh-water admirals, Sir James Yeo, of Kingston,

and Capt Isaac Chauncey, of Sackett's Harbor. Each was loath to risk an action without a crushing superiority in bulk, and the 2 squadrons were fairly well matched in the spring of 1813.

The American commander, a 40-year-old native of Connecticut, had a seeming advantage with 12 vessels to his opponent's 5, but all save one were schooners of insignificant tonnage even by lake standards. In a battle, the more compact and maneuverable British squadron should have been able to hold its own.

Nor was there much to choose between the opposing land forces along the northern front. If the Americans enjoyed an advantage in numbers, the British had a larger proportion of trained regulars. Even the rival commanders had a good deal in common, each being hesitant and indecisive. MajGen Henry Dearborn, the Revolutionary veteran who headed the American army, lacked both the physical and moral stamina for his task. His adversary, Governor General Sir George Prevost, had little to recommend him except persistence. Cautious to the point of timidity, he

frittered away several opportunities which might have led to victory.

Early in 1813 it appeared for a time that he would have to pay for his irresolution. John Armstrong, the new American secretary of war, proposed a plan of operations which might have caused the enemy no end of grief. Reasoning that the British naval base at Kingston was the key to decision, he summed up his conclusions in these words:

"In invading a neighboring and independent territory like Canada, having a frontier of immense extent, destitute of means strictly its own for the purpose of defense, separated from the rest of the empire by an ocean, and having to this but one outlet—this outlet forms your true object or point of attack."

The able and opinionated Armstrong also had a political motive. It was no secret that most of the beef nourishing British troops in Canada had been purchased from Americans. The outbreak of war had found the country divided against itself, with the New England states so bitterly opposed that they later considered secession. Traffic with the enemy went on shamelessly along



the St. Lawrence, and the capture of Kingston would be a blow not only at the British but also at Americans profiting from a treasonable commerce.

Unfortunately, Armstrong was handicapped in his country's "second war of independence" by decrepit veterans of the first war. Dearborn, the nation's senior major general, was a wreck of the gallant New Hampshire colonel who had fought alongside Dan Morgan at Saratoga in 1777. His judgment as well as vigor was impaired, for in apprehensive letters to Armstrong he credited the British at Kingston with 6,000 to 7,000 troops, or about 3 times their actual numbers.

Armstrong's estimate of 900 regulars, or 2,000 men including Canadian militia, proved to have been near the mark. But Dearborn not only shrank from attacking Kingston; he proposed a plan of his own which nullified Armstrong's strategy. Although he had been on the defensive at Sackett's Harbor, expecting a British attack daily, he urged that the American base be stripped of troops and ships for amphibious operations against York (now Toronto) and Fort George at the other end of the lake.

The shipbuilding race had reached the stage where the British had two 24-gun vessels nearing completion, one at Kingston and the other at York. Chauncey was meanwhile finishing a ship at Sackett's Harbor that he planned as the Dreadnaught of the lake. With its 875 tons, crew of 300, and 28 long 24's throwing a broadside of 360 pounds, it would outrange any guns in Yeo's squadron.

It is hard to understand, therefore, why Chauncey should have agreed with Dearborn that it would be good strategy to attack York at the risk of leaving Sackett's Harbor to the mercy of the British at Kingston, only 35 miles away. Both American commanders apparently assumed that the enemy would remain obligingly passive until they returned in triumph from the other end of the lake. Then, at last, they proposed to attack Kingston.

Armstrong gave his reluctant consent only because he hesitated as a civilian in Washington to overrule commanders at the front who claimed a superior knowledge of

local conditions. Now came a period of furious preparation at Sackett's Harbor, which until recently had been dreading an enemy attack. Sixteen hundred men were somehow crammed into the transports, and on 25 April 1813 the armada set sail, leaving behind an inadequate garrison for defense of the American naval base with its valuable stores and nearly completed 28-gun ship.

British inactivity during the next few weeks was to prove fully worthy of Dearborn's faith. Not once did Yeo and Prevost threaten Sackett's Harbor while the Americans surprised York and routed the 600 British defenders with ease. The provincial capital, a mere village at the time, was occupied on 27 April after the capture of the 10-gun brig *Gloucester* and the destruction of the 24-gun ship on the stocks.

Dearborn being too feeble for ac-

tive command, BGen Zebulon Pike led the troops to the attack. But it became a costly victory when the accidental explosion of the British powder magazine killed or wounded 232 Americans and 63 redcoats. Among the dead was the 34-year-old soldier and explorer for whom Pike's Peak was named. He had maintained strict discipline, but Dearborn could not prevent the troops from plundering the village and burning the buildings of the provincial assembly. These unauthorized outrages gave the British their official pretext for setting fire to the capitol and executive mansion in Washington during the summer of 1814.

After embarking at York, the American troops were kept on board the crowded transports for 9 days by stormy weather. Thus it is not surprising to learn from Dearborn's report that the men landed on May

### MajGen Jacob Brown

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8th at Fort Niagara, opposite Fort George, "in a very sickly and depressed state." Since enough reinforcements were available to bring the American army up to a strength of 4,000, its commanders felt confident of their ability to take the British post. They decided, therefore, to allow a period for recuperation while Chauncey returned with the squadron to Sackett's Harbor to replenish his supplies.

On the homeward voyage it may perhaps be conjectured that he raised his spyglass anxiously when the flagship *Madison* sighted the American base at the eastern end of the lake. However this may be, there was no pillar of smoke to indicate that the enemy had destroyed the navy yard and the new ship on the stocks. The American commanders had fared better than they deserved.

As his squadron sailed westward a second time, Chauncey entrusted the defense of Sackett's Harbor to a local militia leader, BGen Jacob Brown. Not much was known about the village squire's military ability, since he had seen little action so far. A 38-year-old ex-Quaker, he had been surveyor, journalist, schoolmaster and farmer before his speculations made him a New York landed proprietor on a modest scale. Chauncey left him nearly 500 regulars and Marines, and Brown could count on about the same number of untrained local militia recruits.

While the squadron returned to Fort Niagara, a large and dedicated young man was making his way to that post from the Pennsylvania shore of Lake Erie. At the age of 28, he was about to collide with the British Empire, which would come off second-best. Thus was history in-

troduced to Oliver Hazard Perry, who has every right to be known as the Nelson of the Great Lakes. Like the British sea hero, he had a deadly instinct for the jugular of an opposing naval force, and he allowed no difficulty to come between him and his single-minded purpose.

The son of a Rhode Island sea captain, he had served against the Barbary pirates as a teen-age sailor. Late in 1812 he was commanding gunboats off the Atlantic Coast when Chauncey had him transferred to Presque Isle (now Erie), Pennsylvania, to build a squadron on Lake Erie. By dint of prodigious exertions, he had two 20-gun brigs and 3 schooners ready for launching in May 1813 when Chauncey invited him to take part in the attack on Fort George.

Perry made the first leg of the journey in a small rowboat and on

*Col Winfield Scott leads the attack on Fort George*

Bettmann Archives





foot. Then in spite of a sailor's prejudice he took to horseback, his long legs dangling from a saddle without stirrups. Neither blisters nor saddle sores could keep him away from a fight; and upon arrival at Fort Niagara, he met another large and dedicated young man named Winfield Scott.

Standing 6'4", the 27-year-old colonel from Virginia already had a reputation as a military fanatic and perfectionist. He saw the point at once when Cdr Perry argued that the Americans had no effective plan for hitting the beaches. They were to land as best they could on the lake shore in the rear of the river fort, which was vulnerable from that side. But Perry contended that the enemy leader, BGen John Vincent, would doubtless march out to counterattack with his 1,600 British regulars and 500 Canadian militia during the confusion when the men waded ashore from the landing boats.

The 2 young American officers reconnoitred the British lake front from a rowboat on the afternoon of 26 May. Although it may seem far-fetched to describe the occasion in such terms, it actually was in effect the final planning conference held by the commanders of the Attack Force and Landing Force. For it was understood that Chauncey and Dearborn would remain on the *Madison* throughout the action while Perry took charge of the landing boats and Scott commanded the troops on shore. And since they were rather pompous and humorless young men, it is at least certain that they took themselves seriously during this planning phase.

Perry's plan was worthy of respect by present-day Navy and Marine Corps amphibious specialists. It called for the landing of the troops in waves spaced far enough apart to provide a minimum of targets for the British artillery. The landing force was to be covered by naval gunfire from the American squadron until a beachhead had been secured and Scott put into effect his plan of battle.

Neither the British nor the American records give a good description of the fight on the morning of 27 May 1813. Considering the lack of training and rehearsals, it can hardly be supposed that the Ameri-



can landing was conducted with much precision by green troops. Yet Gen Vincent was impressed with the spectacle of the squadron standing toward the shore "in an extended line of more than two miles." He reported further that "the fire from the shipping so completely enfiladed and scoured the plains, that it became impossible to approach the beach." Thus he had no choice but to allow the Americans to land undisturbed while he awaited their attack midway between the fort and the beach.

Perry had control of about 500 sailors and Marines manning the boats. They carried out their mission competently, and in the brief action Scott's generalship might

have prevailed even without his advantage in numbers. Dearborn and Chauncey witnessed the battle from the deck of the *Madison*, never suspecting that an enemy squadron was just then dropping anchor for an attack on Sackett's Harbor.

It took a hard fight to dislodge Vincent's force. British casualties of 356 killed, missing and wounded, chiefly regulars of the 8th Regiment, attested to a stout resistance before the defenders fell back. The Americans, who had 40 killed and 120 wounded, found Fort George evacuated and its guns spiked.

Cdr Perry felt well repaid for his part in the victory. The British hold on the Niagara line was so badly shaken that the enemy aban-



doned Fort Erie, opposite Buffalo, thus opening communications between the Niagara river and Presque Isle. Perry found his first opportunity to rescue a brig, 3 schooners and a sloop which had been hemmed in at Black Rock. Dearborn lent him 200 soldiers to drag the vessels against the current of the Niagara to Lake Erie, where they proceeded by sail to join the 5 new little warships at Presque Isle. This gave Perry the squadron with which he won a naval victory the following September immortalized by his famous dispatch, "We have met the


pounder on shore. All that day and the next, the squadron's only activity was the capture of a few American rowboats bringing reinforcements from Oswego to Sackett's Harbor.

Not until dawn on the 29th did the redcoats finally land after 48 hours in the transports. (*Such reputable authorities as Capt Mahan and Henry Adams differ as to whether the British landed on the 28th or 29th. The Mahan version is accepted in this account.*) Thus the American militiamen were given a period of grace in which to recover from their panic at first sight of the enemy.

through the shallows to the beach, then swing eastward to attack the navy yard and barracks.

Brown had no illusions about his militiamen, who would doubtless sprint for the near-by woods at the first sign of danger. But the former schoolmaster knew his history, and his plan at Sackett's Harbor was patterned after the battle of Cowpens in 1781.

On that Revolutionary field BGen Daniel Morgan had placed his shaky militia recruits in the front line with orders to fire 3 shots. Then he made a virtue out of a necessity by giving



enemy and they are ours. . . ."

On Lake Ontario, too, the success at Fort George made prospects seem bright as the British virtually evacuated the Niagara Peninsula. Both American commanders appeared to forget that their plan, as presented to Armstrong, called next for an attack on Kingston to cut the British lifeline. Dearborn remained with most of his troops in the Fort George fight, the British squadron appeared with 800 regulars for an all-out assault on the American base. Some of the troops were in the landing boats, pulling toward shore, when the 2 enemy commanders suddenly recalled them to the transports.

Improbable as it may seem, "light and adverse winds" were cited in the British official report as the reason for the postponement. It is more likely, however, that Yeo and Prevost were influenced by several rounds from an American long 32-

Gen Brown did not fail to take advantage of this reprieve to prepare a warm reception for his visitors.

The small harbor was formed by Navy Point, a tongue of land projecting from the mainland into Black River Bay. At the base of the peninsula were the log barracks, the blockhouse named Fort Tompkins, and the navy yard, with a broad parade ground in front and the village to the left. Two American vessels lay at anchor in the harbor—the captured brig *Gloucester*, and the nearly completed 28-gun ship, named the *Pike* in honor of the fallen general.

Horse Island, within easy wading distance of the mainland, provided the British with a tactical doorstep. At dawn on the 29th when longboats ferried the landing force from the ships to the wooded island, Prevost's plan of attack became evident. The assault troops would wade

them permission to withdraw while the American regulars of the second line bore the brunt of the British attack. When the scared country lads reached the rear, Morgan was waiting to form them again behind a ridge and march them entirely around the field to deliver a surprise flank attack. Thus an undependable militia element, comprising two-thirds of the force, had been transformed into a decisive reserve. And in the resulting victory a small British army was destroyed.

Cowpens became the most imitated battle piece of American history. MajGen Nathaniel Greene made it his model with profit in 2 hard-fought actions, Guilford Courthouse and Eutaw Springs. And now, 3 decades later, Jacob Brown posted his armed farmers and villagers along the shore with orders to hold their ground long enough to fire a few shots at the redcoats wading from Horse Island.

After the anticipated militia flight to the rear, Brown counted on a second line consisting of the 500 regulars and Marines making a stand on the parade ground. While these dependable troops swapped volleys with the enemy, the former Quaker hoped to rally enough of the panting militiamen for a mobile reserve and hit the enemy flank by surprise.

The 48-hour postponement was the first British mistake. Prevost made his second error by sending the landing force into action without adequate fire support. His troops brought no fieldpieces with them, and the naval guns of the squadron remained out of range. This left only a few small gunboats mounting swivels, and Prevost's report admits that "they were unequal to silence the enemy's elevated batteries, or to produce any effect on their blockhouses."

Although Brown's militiamen soon took to their heels, the hardier spirits paused long enough to make it hot for the wading redcoats. An enemy account relates that the grenadiers of the 104th scrambled ashore under "so heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up."

Without having fired as yet a single volley of their own, the redcoats endured further punishment while re-forming on the beach under fire from the 6-pounders of the blockhouse known as Fort Volunteer. After dressing the scarlet ranks, the British column advanced with stately tread and deployed into line on the parade ground. There a memorable fight took place, with both sides standing up to repeated volleys at close musketry range and neither giving an inch.

The British casualties were heavier because of the American 6-pounders firing grapeshot. Yet when the spectacle became hidden by gunpowder smoke, an over-anxious American naval lieutenant concluded that the day was lost. He set fire to the navy yard and the 2 ships in the harbor, thus adding to the ordeal of Brown's regulars and Marines.

The British firing volleys in their faces, and the flames of the blazing warehouses at their backs! Here, surely, was a situation for a heroic



*Statue of Oliver Hazard Perry*

Bettmann Archives



ballad or a scene for an inspiring oleograph. No such tribute was ever paid to the little American force, yet these unsung heroes of a forgotten battle stuck it out to a victorious finish.

The turning point came when the British attempted an attack on the American left flank. By that time, just as the regulars on both sides were nearing exhaustion, Brown had managed to rally a few score militiamen with the aid of the village butcher. He struck the British right flank just as Prevost was carrying out his own flanking movement, and at this stage it took only a convincing threat to decide the issue. The British account relates that "The retreat was sounded. Sir George, fearless of danger and disdaining to run or to suffer his men to run, repeatedly called to them to retire in order; many, however, made off as fast as they could."

Brown knew better than to attempt a pursuit with his unstable militiamen. Besides, all hands were needed as firemen after the battle; and the 2 ships were saved, though the navy yard burned to the ground with its valuable stores.

The enemy was allowed to withdraw to Horse Island and row away in the longboats without any interference other than shots from the long 32-pounder at Fort Tompkins. And immediately the British squadron set sail for Kingston.

The casualty lists leave no doubt that a savage fight took place. British losses in killed, wounded or missing amounted to 259 officers and men, while 172 Americans were killed or wounded. This meant that each side had lost a third of the

troops engaged on the parade ground, since the casualties of the militia were insignificant.

As for the big picture, it would be pleasing to record that the 2 American victories had led to decisive results on the northern front. But there can be no decision when such irresolute characters as Dearborn and Chauncey are pitted against such kindred souls as Prevost and Yeo.

After the success at Fort George, Dearborn managed within the next 2 weeks to incur 2 humiliating reverses on the Niagara Peninsula when American detachments surrendered. The cause did not even benefit from his resignation shortly afterwards, since he was relieved by a more inept Revolutionary veteran, the unprincipled MajGen James Wilkinson.

Chauncey continued to avoid making serious mistakes by avoiding action whenever possible. The launching of the *Pike* gave him a comfortable naval superiority on Lake Ontario in spite of the completion of the new 24-gun ship at Kingston. But even though the *Pike's* long 24's could outrange any guns of the British squadron, they were never given the opportunity to do much damage. A few half-hearted naval engagements took place, but both fresh-water admirals were content to carry on their ship-building race until the end of the war. As if by tacit consent, neither Sackett's Harbor nor Kingston was ever threatened again.

It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to infer that the American cause did not benefit in the long run from the two victories in May 1813. On the contrary, these fights

gave a start to military leaders who set traditions for their country's armed forces throughout the next four decades.

Both Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott found their first opportunity to demonstrate that they could command a small army in battle. Brown was rewarded by being appointed a brigadier in the regular army, and early in 1814 he put up a second star after relieving the fatuous Wilkinson as commander on the northern front. Scott being made a brigadier shortly afterwards, the 2 generals trained the little American army which gave such a good account of itself during the summer of 1814 at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane.

Perry followed up his famous naval victory by transporting across Lake Erie the army with which William Henry Harrison defeated the British and Indians in the battle of the Thames. There is no telling what this prodigious young man might have accomplished in later life, for Perry died of yellow fever only 5 years after the war. Brown remained in the army and became commanding general from 1821 until his death in 1828. As for Scott, it is hardly necessary to add that he led the invading American army in the Mexican War and served as commanding general during the 20 years before his death in 1861.

The old saw to the effect that "a good man is hard to find" is particularly applicable in time of war. And when we consider the 3 good men who came to the front in a single day on Lake Ontario, the amphibious double-header of 1813 seems worthy of a proud page in our military chronicles. US MC



### As You Were

✻ THIS ONE comes from an old "China Marine" and dates back to the good days of the late '20s when the Corps maintained a Shanghai contingent.

A brand new Second Lieutenant had reported in for duty. Upon being assigned a platoon, his troops were fallen out in order that he could deliver his prepared address of introduction. With the completion of his brief talk, he commenced to run his platoon through the manual of arms.

Satisfied with their performance of the basic commands, he decided to launch into something more complicated by ordering "Fix bayonets." No movement. Once again, only louder, he commanded "Fix bayonets." As before no movement.

At this point the Platoon Sergeant stepped forward to volunteer the information that the troops had not fallen out with bayonets.

Maintaining the utmost in dignity and command presence, the Lieutenant said, "Thank you, Sergeant." Then turning to the platoon he calmly announced, "As you were — unfix bayonets."


Capt L. E. Bulwer



# Combat Uniform **ATOMIC** Style

By Capt James W. Hanker

Illustrated by MSgt Michael Garbus




**Let's equip our Marines with a combat uniform as modern  
as the weapons-family with which they will fight**

☛ LIKE A MOLTING SNAKE SHEDDING its skin the Marine Corps for the past 10 years has been gripped in the throes of structural change. Nature demands that the change of skin be made, the advent of the nuclear weapon and the helicopter demand that the new concept be installed.

These "convulsions of change" started with the detonation of the atomic bomb over the city of Hiroshima, they will end only when the new "skin" is in place. Underneath both of these new skins, however, still exists the basic animal, the body of the snake in the case of mother nature, the basic Marine in the case of the Corps.

The snake must accept his new skin and fit into it as best he can, but the Marine is adaptable to changes which will more proficiently prepare him to fit into this new skin, the new concept of amphibious operations.

If this is true, then why does the Marine Corps persist in remodeling



everything for this new concept with the exception of this basic element, the Marine? We have evolved new tactics, developed new techniques, devised new supplies, but what of the Marine? What do I mean? Let's take a look at a typical maneuver of today, exercising this new concept of amphibious operations, and I will point out what I mean.

By dawn's early light a flight of helicopters, Marines embarked, roars up from the flat deck of a carrier cruising several miles off of the enemy coastline. Seconds later a major enemy strongpoint, located some 10 miles inland from the heavily fortified beach is neutralized by the detonation of a special weapon. The inbound chopper pilots receive direction from pre-D-Day landed pathfinder teams and roar onto the various and dispersed landing zones of the stricken enemy objective.

Hard charging Marines begin to boil forth from the helicopters to apply the *coups de grace* to the stunned foe. One helicopter is delayed in take-off—while 2 Marines attempt to untangle themselves from the web seat—and is hit by ground fire. Another Marine quickly and safely clears the doorway of his chop-

per only to lose his cumbersome, ill-fitting, steel helmet. As he stops to retrieve it he presents a fat target to a nearby aggressor rifleman. Another Marine hits the deck and winces in pain as his bulky canteen swings inward and is crushed between his right thigh and the hard ground. Still another, having emptied his M-1, rolls over onto his left side and begins to dig frantically for another clip of ammunition as the enemy rushes towards him, only to find it locked securely behind a smashed snap. On the left flank a fire team begins to exercise fire and maneuver against an enemy strongpoint. As they move forward in their leap-frog tactics they are constantly poked, slapped and impeded by the numerous accessories dangling from their cartridge belts.

Now let us envisage for a moment that this is not just an exercise, but instead is actual combat. Suddenly the entire area is blanced with a white light, a deafening roar breaks around the assault unit. The enemy has countered with an air-burst atomic device! Although the weapon missed the planned ground zero, the center of the objective that the Marines are assaulting, the effects are

still staggering. Too late Marines throw up their hands to ward off the burning thermal wave. They clutch at burned hands and seared cheeks. Many of the Marines wander in blinded circles, their sight momentarily destroyed by the tremendous light emitted at the moment of detonation. In an instant this assault unit has been transformed into a defensive unit, and a badly damaged one at that.

My point is simply this. While we constantly strive to perfect this new operational concept, we persist in outfitting the personnel who are to enforce it in uniforms as outmoded as those of the knights of old. Many Marines argue that the present combat uniform saw us through the savage fighting of the South Pacific and Korea, why shouldn't it suffice for future combat?

There are 2 major reasons why our present uniform for combat is obsolete. First, the probable employment of nuclear weapons in any future combat. This type of weapon differs from the conventional ordnance employed today in that it is a triple threat weapon, consisting of blast, thermal radiation and nuclear radiation. Our fighting men must be so clothed and equipped that they can resist these effects in the best possible manner.

The second reason is that tomorrow's forces must be widely dispersed and highly mobile to avoid presenting too profitable a nuclear target to the enemy. Mobility means that the individual fighting man and his supplies may be transported via air the majority of the time, and hence must be as light as possible.

Thus we can see that the future uniform of the individual fighting man must now incorporate features which will protect him from the effects of the nuclear detonation as well as from the elements of nature, and still permit him to maintain the high degree of mobility essential for the accomplishment of his mission.

Remember, in the future the Marine is going to be dropped right into the middle of the fight, he has got to be able to move out, now! Like a boxer he has one major initial aim, to knock out the opponent. Therefore, when he steps into the ring he should have nothing on him that will impede him in his effort to accomplish this. In between rounds,



**Capt Hanker** enlisted in the Marine Corps in June of 1951 and was commissioned in September of the same year. He has served in the 1st and 3d Mar Divs, Marine Corps Test Unit 1, and is presently serving with the Marine Corps Equipment Board. He wrote this article because "the advent of special weapons has changed our concept of warfare; however, the individual Marine is still using the same combat uniform and equipment that he used in WWII."



additional supplies and required items will be made available to sustain him in his fight or to prepare him for the next one. Keeping all of these facts in mind, let's look at how a Marine, prepared for combat in this atomic era, should be outfitted.

His helmet is a close fitting, smoothly finished piece of headgear. This, as are all of the external accessories, is finished with a dull green, fire-proof lacquer. This color is chosen for purposes of camouflage. The heat resistant lacquer aids in protecting the individual from the thermal effect of a nuclear detonation. Halfway up the front of the helmet is a small round knob set in a recessed groove which extends down to the front rim. When this knob is pushed in and down the groove, a polaroid shield slides into view covering the upper part of the face. This serves 3 purposes. It prevents thermal burn to the covered portion of the face, lessens retinal damage and flash blindness caused by the brilliant light emitted at the moment of detonation, and protects the eyes from the whipped-up dust encountered when dealing with helicopters. The only break in the rear contour of the helmet is a  $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wide, 8-inch long, band antenna, which curves around the rear portion along the rim. Unbuckling the wide soft-leather chin strap, which helps to keep the helmet firmly in position, and removing it, one discovers that the 2-piece plastic helmet is extremely light, approximately 12 ounces in all. Its interior is lined with a thick layer of formed foam plastic. This fits the head closely, serving as a cooling insulator in the summer and as a warmer in the cold seasons. This interior lining is attached to the outer plastic shell by means of a series of small, stiff, springs which snap it into position. A  $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch air space between helmet and liner functions both as an additional source of insulation and as an excellent shock absorber. If the outer shell is damaged the inner portion can be snapped out and inserted into a new shell, and vice-versa of course, if the inner section should be rendered ineffective.

At the back of the helmet is a small "trap door," opened by pulling the small tab attached. Inside is a miniature radio receiver. Tiny sili-

con wafers or solar batteries, in a cluster on top of the helmet, provide all of the energy required. These are connected to small storage batteries for night time operation and provide current for as long as one year. The receiver is attached to the external band antenna and serves a vital function. Today enemy nuclear weapons can be delivered at speeds faster than sound, which means that even if detected on long range radar scopes there may not be sufficient time to warn subordinate units via the normal chain of command communications. Therefore, all of the individual helmet sets will be tuned to the same frequency for the receipt of any flash warnings of impending atomic detonations.

The body portion of the uniform consists of a one-piece, "overall" type outfit. This is called the combat suit, and is made of a light-weight, rayon-nylon fabric. It is light grey in color and incorporates the "breathing-cooling" features of a good summer suit. For winter seasons an additional suit, or suits, fashioned of the same material, with a  $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch quilted backing added, is issued. This is slipped on right over the light-weight outfit. Both of these have a zipper extending from neck to crotch for quick entry and exit. They are loose fitting to ensure complete freedom of movement. At the end of each sleeve, 6 snaps encircle the wrist so that gloves, fashioned of the same material, with a leather facing on the palms, can be attached.


There is a large 10" x 10" zippered pouch on each side of the upper

chest and also on the side of each leg. The pouch on the top left is for gloves and any battle plans or maps. The top right one is for 2 flat packaged rations, containing crackers, fortified chocolate tablets, and dehydrated soups and coffee. These provide sufficient rations for a 2-day period.




The pouch on the outside of the right leg contains four, 20-round clips of ammunition for the light-weight, semi-automatic weapon the man will carry. The pouch on the left leg contains 2 additional clips of ammunition, a first-aid packet, water purification tablets, and a small 2-cell flashlight.

Six snaps around the bottom of each trouser leg attach to the boots. The entire suit is water-proof, keeping the man more comfortable during inclement weather and enabling him to wash off any residual contamination which he may encounter. The snaps, securing the trousers to the boots and the gloves to the sleeves, complete this seal and so aid in the protection of the individual. Body armor will be an optional item of uniform to be designated by the unit commander, and dependent upon the situation and the type of operation.

The boots are similar to those employed today with 2 exceptions. First, they are slip-ons with an elastic top band that, combined with the suspender action provided when they are snapped to the trouser leg, sustains them in position. Second, they have an inner layer of thin lead foil which provides added protection







when crossing a radiologically contaminated area. This foil layer further acts as insulation against adverse weather conditions. For the winter months there is an outer overshoe constructed of light-weight rubber, lined with a 1/2-inch layer of foam glass sponge. These are slipped on over the boot for added protection from the cold, and like the inner boots can be attached to the trousers by snaps.

One of the most vital of supplies to the fighting man is his water. Without it the hardiest individual is soon weakened, the best unit crippled. Closer inspection of this future fighting uniform discloses that the time honored, but outmoded, canteen has been discarded, replaced by a water-belt. This is a flexible plastic cylinder, 4 inches in diameter, with a capacity of slightly less than one quart. It is attached to a belt and is sufficiently strong enough to support the full weight of the body in a prone position. It is easily detached from the belt for utilization and when emptied can be utilized as a life preserver for troops being transported over water.

The bothersome belt of today, with all of its dangling accessories, has been eliminated. Now the individual can move out when embarking and debarking from helicopters, and when pressing forward in the vital assault phase of an attack.

Each man would wear a "monitor" watch on his right wrist. This is actually a small radiological dosimeter providing the individual with the means to detect any radiological contamination. In addition it has a chemical color indicator which will disclose the presence of any harmful chemical agent.

The weapon of the Marine will be a 6-pound, semi-automatic, gas-operated, clip-fed rifle. It has a readily accessible lensatic compass in the non-metal stock, and will fire a .30 caliber round.

All of these items I have described herein, have been and can be constructed today. Outfitted thusly, the Marine would be as modern as the new concept which he is to enforce. With this combination—this modern Marine and this new concept—the Corps will be in a better position to sustain their claim to the title, "The finest military organization in the entire world."

US MC

## GP BOMBS IN THE ASSAULT

1ST SVC BN 1ST MAR DIV. — "Fifty hours prior to the landing, tactical air began the neutralization of the target area. Of the total aircraft available for pre-invasion strikes, 24 were diverted to a special mission in and around the landing site. They carried ordnance loads of 4 specially fused 500-pound GP bombs, rockets and small arms.

"These craft placed their bombs on pre-selected installations within the landing site. Bombing runs completed, they exhausted rockets and small arms against targets of opportunity, then returned to their carriers. Fuel and ordnance replenished, the special mission craft took off for more bombing runs against targets of immediate tactical importance to the landing effort. Complete mission time—2 hours. At the end of the first day, during which they had 14 hours of operational daylight, these planes had dropped 672, 500-pound bombs on the objective area.

"But not one of these bombs had exploded; they were delayed fuzed.

"On the second day, planes of the special mission repeated the performance. They continued pounding pre-selected targets, making their bomb runs with skill and precision, seemingly oblivious of the fact that they were apparently dropping nothing but duds. Again they dropped 672, 500-pounders, bringing the total for the 2-day effort to 1344 bombs, or 336 tons of high explosives.

"At 0745 the following morning the entire objective area erupted like an elongated volcano, spewing up sheets of flame and gushers of smoke. The entire 336 tons of bombs, the potential carefully placed on pre-selected targets during the preparation bombing, had exploded en masse. Destruction was total and awesome.

"Helicopters carrying the landing force began disgorging the first wave at the landing site even before the smoke had cleared away. Resistance? Hardly! The bombs had shattered command integrity completely. They destroyed every

physical agency through which a commander exercises control, and they dealt a traumatic psychological blow to the survivors, rendered them emotionally incapable of receiving or responding to orders. Before the enemy could even begin to organize any semblance of coordinated resistance, the landing was an accomplished fact."

This is the way a future operation might be summarized—provided a bomb fuze of certain characteristics be developed. The fuze poses no problem, in design, manufacture, or employment. We will discuss it in detail later.

There is nothing new about using general purpose bombs in support of tactical plans. Everytime we have called in an air strike, every time we have set out to neutralize a landing site with bombs, we have done just that. But it has never been possible to pile up a potential military damage on a target area, then cash in on that potential when its effects would be most beneficial to the landing plans.

Further, the reduction of a single military installation at a time allows the enemy to reorganize his defensive plans without that installation. The envisioned mass detonation of preparation bombing would completely preclude such reorganization.

The tonnage of HE shown in the above summary is well within the capacity of present strike aircraft for the period involved. That tonnage could be increased—by assigning more of the available air to this type mission, or by increasing the time allotted to preparation bombing (possibly including night strikes).

Let's look at this type bombing in relation to the enemy's capabilities. First, he may not be aware that a buildup of potential is taking place. Should reports of apparent duds or long delay bombs be slow in reaching the enemy command—or should such reports not be reduced to a meaningful pattern, then it will be all over before the commander can comprehend what was happening. But suppose he receives the reports and realizes their significance? He

cannot have the bombs disarmed for reasons we will discuss later. Other than standing fast while the HE steadily mounts on his installations, he can shift his entire defense structure within the objective area, or he can pull out completely. The one course of action puts his command into a complete reorganization during a critical period, the other leaves the area defenseless.

This particular use of GP bombs need not be confined to landings. It lends itself to any assault situation, provided there is time for preparation and the necessary aircraft are available. Thus, it can be used for the landing itself and for subsequent objectives.

Would it be possible to accomplish the same result with a mass flight of aircraft over the objective area just prior to the landing? No, not exactly. Even if the required air were available (336 planes would be needed in a one-flight run to duplicate what our 24 craft did in two days) total tonnage is not the only consideration. The slow buildup concept allows each bomb to be placed on a target of military significance. The mass bombing run would be of the saturation type in which military damage could not be forecast except in terms of probabilities.

As stated, the fuze required to produce these results poses no problem. It would be a mechanical or electrical long-delay fuze with a range of from 10 to 144 hours. The fuze would be settable in hours and minutes and would have to be of utmost accuracy. In fact, as insurance, 2 of the clockwork mechanisms might be mounted in parallel within the fuze body. A premature detonation wouldn't adversely affect the landing operation, but a fuze that activated after the landing had been effected might cause casualties among our own personnel. Every mechanical safeguard must be incorporated in the fuze to preclude this eventuality.

The fuze would be set by mechanical fuze setters aboard the carriers or at the landing fields. The time set would represent the time lag to H-hour. The delay mechanism would start functioning immediately. For aircraft safety, an interruption can be embodied in the fuze which would keep it in an unarmed condition until dropped on a normal run. Too, it is advisable to provide the pilot with a means of aborting on safe if necessary, and allow him an election of impact burst should he run across a target of opportunity suitable for a bomb strike. The fuze then becomes both safe and elastic in application.

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The fuze must be difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to disarm. Otherwise, he can dispose of them as they accumulate. We can thwart his disposal efforts by rigging anti-disturbance devices in the fuze so sensitive that they can't be touched. And to protect our own disposal personnel in the event of duds, we can provide a mechanical means of shunting out the anti-disturbance device should the clockwork stop and the fuze fail to fire.

Do we have any fuzes available today adaptable to this use? No. The long delay fuze we have available is a chemical type and meets none of the basic requirements. First it is not settable, comes only with factory determined delays. Then, since the delay is accomplished by allowing an acid to eat through a celluloid disc, an action whose speed is controlled by temperature, there is a built-in margin of time error. With some temperature variations, that error might be as high as 50 per cent. Thus, in order to predict with accuracy when one of these fuzes would explode, you would have to know beforehand every temperature change to which it would be subjected after drop.

Assault is the Marine Corps' business. The recommended use of GP bombs would give assault a greater impetus. With careful preparation and intelligent execution, it should destroy the enemy's means and break his will to fight before the battle is joined.

CWO Earl A. Pike

## THE FMF

**CAMP SMEDLEY BUTLER.**—The dispersal of the Strategic Air Command has recently received attention in the newspapers in the light of the Russian known capability for building engines with ICBM thrust capabilities. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee has highlighted for the public this aspect of defense.

In the not too distant future it seems probable that we will have to grapple with some hard decisions on garrisoning our Fleet Marine Force to cope with enemy missilery capabilities. Within the past decade we have achieved wide range deployment and dispersal procedures in our amphibious operation. To retain our positive ability to serve as a force-in-readiness, we must be certain of adequate dispersal in these days of "peace." The fact that our FMF centers may not now be lucrative targets is certainly no assurance they will not be in the immediate future, and certainly they will be after the first hot shot is fired.

Navy fleet disposition is not the only major related factor to the positioning

of garrisoned FMF units. There must also be considered enemy weapon capabilities, training areas, present capital investments in bases, dependents' support, training supervision and tactical formations.

An FMF Structure Board has recently evaluated our tactical formations and equipment; it is suggested that a Bases' Board is now in order. The exigencies of day to day operations likely preclude HQMC planning sections from giving adequate study to this problem. This matter will assume increasing urgency, and its resolution will be more difficult, if perhaps somewhat less important, than the structural formation of the FMF.

Actually, our FMF tactical formations and their "home ports" are related, and perhaps the next "study" Board could grapple with both problems. However, considering the information required by a Bases Board, and the "lead time" required in installations planning, an independent Bases Board seems indicated, and it is suggested that even now there is a requirement for preliminary ground-work in this area of planning. If a Bases Board did no more than provide approved guidance for our Shore Station Development Boards in requiring that enemy attack possibilities be considered in Shore Station Planning, such a board would well justify its creation.

LtCol T. M. Burton

## RECRUITING AND AOLs

**MCRS, LOUISVILLE, KY.**—As a Legal Chief, in my normal occupation, I was always closely concerned with the absentee problem within the commands I served. Every effort was exerted to combat the problem with leadership, the usual lectures, personal contact and attention to personal problems, and expeditious administration of discipline. And, at the time I left my field to come on Recruiting Duty, I am happy to say that the picture had cleared considerably, and that unauthorized absence was beginning to come under control. But, until I became a MCRS Sergeant Major, I never realized how much the present system of handling absentees and deserters that surrender or are delivered to MCRS compounds, and, in some instances which I hope to point out in this letter, actually abets absenteeism.

The Marine Corps Manual provides that if an absentee or deserter, who has been absent less than 60 days, surrenders or is delivered to a MCRS, providing he does not make a statement that he will not comply with straggler orders, and that he has not previously failed to comply with straggler orders for the same

period of unauthorized absence, he will be issued orders to return to his organization without Marine Corps guard. Even if he has been absent 59 days prior to apprehension or surrender; even if the man has previously been issued straggler's orders with which he failed to comply at a previous time, and after a previous absence for which he has already been punished; and, even if Recruiting personnel are convinced in their own mind that the man will not comply with his orders.

I would like to propose 3 solutions to this phase of the problem. First, I believe that the period of time that a man has to be in unauthorized absence status before he can be detained and disposition instructions requested from the CMC should be reduced to 30 days in all cases. At the very least, it should be reduced in the case of the man who has to be apprehended. If civil or military authorities had not caught the man when they did (as pointed out, sometimes on the 59th day of absence), he would have been still gone well over the present 60 day limitation.

Second, I think that if a man has a previous record at the MCRS of having failed to comply with straggler's orders on prior occasions, that the MCRS

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should have authority to detain him and request disposition instructions.

Third, it is felt that Recruiting Officers, if they feel in their judgment and service experience that the individual, regardless of the length of his absence, is the type of character who definitely will not comply with his orders, should have authority to detain the man and request disposition instructions.

Of course, I have a somewhat selfish motive in bringing up this problem. Whenever an absentee or deserter surrendering or being delivered to this Station has to be issued straggler's orders, it ties up 2 SNCOs for at least an hour—more than that, if you consider the time spent in going to the local jail to take custody of the man—making out the NAVMC 10044-PD, cutting his travel orders, preparing his arrest orders, preparing transportation requests and meal tickets, making train or plane reservations, and instructing the straggler—even when I know in my own mind that the individual will never comply with his orders, and that we will pick him up again in a few days. Besides the time and money expended in these procedures, there is also the cost to the Marine Corps of later processing checkages against the man's pay and processing the T/Rs and meal tickets. Then, too, there are the future days lost to the Marine Corps in returning the man to a duty status, and the impossible to estimate cost of subsequently trying him for the compounded offenses at a higher court.

I am sure that it was not the intent and purpose of either the drafters of the UCMJ, or the applicable chapter of the MCM, to "give a man enough rope to hang himself." But every one of the instances cited above encourage this situation.

MSgt W. H. Foster

## HORSE MARINES

♣ MCS, QUANTICO, VA.—Recent articles in military and civil periodicals have indicated a need for a US Armed Forces-sponsored Olympic Equestrian Team. Here is an excellent opportunity for the Marine Corps to provide this need and assist the US in the 1960 Olympic Games to regain international recognition as the leader in athletic endeavor. This is one of the many apparent needs that would be answered by the revival of the "Horse Marines." In addition to the favorable public opinion, per se, that would be generated from this Marine Corps Horse Troop, certain recruiting benefits could be realized by the interest accrued due to continued Olympic Games participation.

Currently, the equestrian facilities maintained at Marine Corps posts are

primarily utilized for recreational purposes. The establishment of a Marine Corps Horse Troop would provide additional incentives and purpose to the equestrian's use of the present facilities. The initiation of polo teams, as a result of this increase in equestrian interest, would further the competitive spirit that is essential to a military organization.

The Marine Corps Band has enjoyed public favor and recognition as "The President's Own" in numerous national ceremonies. A Marine Corps Horse Troop could attain a similar title, i.e., "The President's Horse Guard," and gain additional distinction for the Marine Corps as a mounted escort in national ceremonies.

Thus far this discussion has encompassed only the consideration of garrison service; therefore, to make the Marine Corps Horse Troop a realistic and practical unit during this period of austerity in money and manpower, it is necessary to include the considerations of combat service. During the recent political police action "Reckless" and the "Mule School" at MCS, Quantico, Va., met a logistical requirement that evolved as a result of conducting static mountain warfare operations in a locale lacking an adequate rail and road system to support motorized forces. Due to the geophysical nature of the earth's surface the Marine Corps may become involved in combat operations on large land masses having inadequate rail and road systems to support motorized forces. Thus a similar logistical requirement may again present itself despite the availability of helicopter support.

The dispersion and mobility required to execute the current helicopter doctrine dictate wider frontages and/or increased depth to tactical arrangements in static and fluid operations. These factors applied to an area with deficient land communications places an additional burden upon tactical and logistical air transportation, resulting in overextension of the capabilities of helicopter support. In addition, the reconnaissance effort needed to develop rapid information that must encompass the future's extended battle area, regardless of terrain, necessitates the utilization of all available local and organic modes of transportation. All these aforementioned statements lead to the conclusion that there is a probable requirement to train certain units how to augment their mobility capability to transport men and material rapidly by using horses and mules in conjunction with helicopters. Further, there is a probable requirement to train and equip certain units with horses and mules to execute their mission in conjunction with motorized land and air transportation.

Naturally, an extensive study would be necessary to determine specific requirements, and field exercises would be necessary to test the feasibility of using quadrupeds in an amphibious operation of the future. The minimum action that should be taken is an investigation of this area of transport in future wars to facilitate exploitation of the helicopter doctrine. With a firm combat requirement and a definite garrison need the reappearance of the "Horse Marines" is assured.

Certainly this Marine Corps Horse Troop would have a very small beginning with possibly one or two dozen members capable of riding jumpers, riding in ceremonial formations, training their mounts, and instructing equitation students. The number of horses needed would be a compromise between the number and type available and the size of the desired participating unit. The equipment and facilities that are available would have to be augmented by the desired ceremonial apparatus. All these manpower and material requirements are within the present Marine Corps capacity. A desire for distinction, an appreciation of tradition, and a conviction to execute assigned missions commits the Marine Corps to the establishment of a group of "Horse Marines."

Capt P. E. Pearson

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# the Hungarian Revolution: a military post-mortem

**The Kremlin is clearly facing a dilemma when  
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Wide World Photo

## A Serious Gap

A PRODIGIOUS AMOUNT HAS ALREADY been written about the Hungarian Revolution of October/November 1956, from the inconsequential literary efforts of writers with a fine sense for what may prove to be a best-seller, to serious histories and scientifically compiled collections of documents. It is thus surprising that we do not have a systematic evaluation of the military aspects of the revolt. A good many facts bearing on the military problems connected with the uprising have, of course, been brought out, in particular in such valuable works as the report of the UN Committee on Hungary or Melvin Lasky's "white book." These facts have, however, not been properly correlated nor has their significance been appreciated. Some attempts at a military critique of the revolt have appeared in the German professional literature, but they are not searching enough to do justice to the subject. The reason for this dearth of material undoubtedly is that at first sight the Hungarian Revolution does not seem to offer any interest from the purely military point of view: to the non-professional observer the operations in Hungary appear to have been a "push-over" for the crushingly superior Soviet forces. This they undoubtedly were

in the end, but that they became a "push-over" was in itself so surprising that the Soviet Command could not and did not count on it and had to lay plans for a very different kind of campaign. The politico-military preparations made on the Soviet side for this campaign which was never fought are of the greatest professional interest. They constitute an excellent example of operations in a "brush-fire" type war, about the conduct of which we hear so much and know so little. And they point out most important lessons which deserve to be studied both by political and by military leaders.

The following is merely an attempt to draw attention to the main points deserving study — no more could be done in an essay such as this. To make sure that no classified information may inadvertently slip into the text (always a danger that faces a writer who has some access to classified material), all technical data on the Soviet and satellite forces have been taken from Liddell Hart's *The Soviet Army*.

### The Military Situation and the Soviet Alert Plan

In October 1956 there were 2 Soviet divisions in Hungary, the 2d and the 17th Mechanized. Their purpose was obviously not to control

the country — for this they had insufficient strength, but rather to back with an absolutely reliable armed force a communist government ruling a population that was in its vast majority anti-communist or at least non-communist. They thus provided a very necessary stiffening to the organized combat elements of the police, of which the state security forces (AVH) were the most closely attached to the regime. The vast Hungarian armed forces were clearly considered of questionable value if it came to quelling internal disturbances. The concentration of the major Soviet units around Cegled (2d Mech Div) and Szekesfehérvár (17th Mech Div), about 70 km. South-East and South-West of Budapest, respectively, was a pretty clear indication of their primary mission. In carrying out the latter, they were under the direction of the Soviet military attaché (at the time, General Boikov) who was responsible to the Soviet Ambassador (Mr. Andropov), who in turn worked hand in hand with the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (Mr. Gerö).

There was obviously a pre-arranged plan for Soviet police action which came into force, most probably automatically, upon the decision of the Soviet authorities in Hungary that an emergency existed. Thus the question of which so much has been made, "Were the Soviet forces requested to help quell the disturbances in Budapest, and if so, by whom and when?" appears purely academic: the Soviet troops, which marched into Budapest from 0200 until the afternoon of 24 October, were clearly acting under whatever alert plan for police action there was for the 2 Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary.

Just as clearly there existed another plan for the more serious case of a political "coup" in which the Hungarian forces, or at least a significant part of them, would support a new regime not approved by Moscow. Such a plan had been put into operation in respect to Poland on the night of 18/19 October. As to Hungary, the alert was sounded about 36 hours later, some time on 20 October, to deal with a military situation which from the Soviet point of view was considerably more difficult than that in Poland. In both cases the aim obviously was to



By Wing Commander John Gellner, RCAF





Wide World Photo

### **Hungarian freedom-fighter holds home-made "Molotov cocktail"**

nip resistance in the bud and to gain *physical control* of the country as quickly and as discreetly as possible, any other solution being politically unacceptable. The emphasis thus had to be on ground operations. But whereas Poland lay between the arms of a nutcracker, formed by the bulk of the Soviet armed forces in European Russia and the strongest, most mobile Soviet army group and tactical air force in East Germany, there were comparatively few forces immediately available for intervention in Hungary. Operations in Poland posed only comparatively minor logistic problems; those in Hungary became necessarily a huge and difficult exercise in troop movements and supply.

The Soviet plan could undoubtedly be reconstructed from the available evidence. This—if it has not been done already—would provide a most useful study of Soviet military methods. In broad outline, the Soviet position was this: perhaps 4 divisions (apart from the 2 in Hungary assigned to, and as it proved fully occupied with, the police action) were immediately available, 2 (the 32nd and 34th Mechanized) in

Western Roumania, not more than 2 in what as Subcarpathian Ruthenia had been part of Czechoslovakia and was now the farthest southwestern corner of the Soviet Ukraine. The shortest reinforcement route—and the only one that could be entirely hidden from the eyes of the world, a very important political consideration—led through the latter province. This route had the disadvantage of being barred by the main range of the Carpathians where communications are few and of comparatively low capacity. Yet it was the one apparently provided for by the Soviet plan and probably all Soviet reinforcements that followed the first wave of troops from Roumania and Subcarpathian Ruthenia entered Hungary by that route. We will see that it carried, in about 10 days, between 3 and 4 divisions, 40,000 men or so, all told.

It appears from Soviet troop movements during the period that the plan called for pushing the 2 fast divisions from Roumania right across the country to seal off Hungary from the West. At the same time, the troops from Subcarpathian Ruthenia would move south-west-

wards to a jump-off position about 150 kilometers east of Budapest. This yielded the further dividend of immobilizing the 3 infantry divisions and the air units of the 2d Hungarian Military District (Debrecen), which found themselves within the Soviet assembly area. From there the final advance was launched that led to the complete occupation of the country.

If we postulate the existence of such a plan—and it is practically certain that a plan for the military occupation of Hungary existed, all worked out months and probably years before the emergency of 1956—then much that remained unexplained in the military history of the uprising becomes clear. Much was made, for instance, of the fact that different troops from those which first fought in Budapest were used in the end to conquer Hungary. From that, the fanciful deduction was drawn that the Soviet Command was forced to replace the original occupation troops because the latter tended to sympathize with the Hungarian people. (There were indications of low morale in the 2nd and 17th Mechanized Divisions, and there were some defections, but the general combat efficiency of these 2 units does not seem to have been seriously affected.) The plain fact clearly is that the 2 divisions stationed in Hungary were assigned to the police action, what for convenience we may call "Case A," not to the larger operation planned for the event of a change in the Hungarian regime unfavourable to the Soviet Union "Case B." Another instance of a misapprehension is the belief that there was a big Soviet assault on Budapest on 27 October, an attack presumably repulsed by the freedom fighters. Even the UN Committee on Hungary accepted that the Soviet Command launched such an attack. In reality this was the day when elements of the 2 fast divisions from Roumania passed through Budapest on their planned march to western Hungary. It is clear that they then entered the capital only because it is an important hub of communications and contains the best bridges across the Danube (and perhaps to make a show of force at the same time), and that they fought not to take Budapest



**Wing Commander Gellner** was born in Trieste of Czech parents (his father was a medical officer in the Czechoslovak Army). He received his doctor's degree in law at the University of Brno. After the German occupation in 1939, he escaped to the US and in 1940 enlisted in the RCAF. A well known author and lecturer he is presently an instructor at the RCAF Staff College, Toronto, Canada.

but to brush aside the freedom fighters who blocked the road. The subsequent movements of the 32d and 34th Mechanized Divisions, and the fact that wounded from these formations suddenly appeared in Budapest hospitals on 28 October, prove that this is what happened. Indeed, most Russian military moves before the final assault can be explained in the light of a long-prepared plan on the lines tentatively sketched in this chapter.

### To Attack or Not to Attack

In Poland, the Soviets threatened to unseat the new Gomulka government by force of arms, but in the end did nothing. In Hungary, too, they hesitated for some days, but then they crushed Imre Nagy's regime mercilessly. There were political reasons for treating Poland differently from Hungary. Moscow was able to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Polish leaders, pretty well on the lines of the famous "Principles for Further Developing and Strengthening Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries." Hungary, by denouncing the Warsaw Treaty and declaring itself neutral, was clearly leaving the Soviet orbit. As one of their leaders, Bela Kovács, put it, the Hungarians had gone politically "too fast and too far." But there were also military reasons, and these undoubtedly weighed as heavily with the Kremlin as the political. They can be summarized as follows: In Poland, the armed forces remained firmly in the hands of officers who backed the new regime. To unseat the latter, the Russians would have had to fight a major campaign. While the outcome of the latter could not be in doubt, it would have been long-drawn and sanguinary enough to make fighting it politically undesirable. The Hungarian regular military forces disintegrated at the very beginning of the uprising. The all-out Russian attack came when it had become clear that it would meet no effective opposition and thus would achieve its aim in the shortest time and with the least fuss possible. The success of the Hungarian Revolution hinged on finding clear-headed political, and energetic military leadership. Neither was forthcoming.

The Hungarian armed forces, on

which so much depended, were in the Fall of 1956 in the throes of a major reorganization, yet even so their potential power was considerable. Of major units they comprised 10 fully organized army divisions, of which 2 were mechanized and one in an advanced stage of mechanization; and 2 complete air divisions, with a third above skeleton strength. There were independent heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery brigades, a horse cavalry brigade, and, in the process of formation but at least at brigade strength, an airborne division belonging to the Air Force. Supporting services were rather scanty, certainly by Western standards. Total strength of the regular armed forces was about 250,000 all ranks. There were some serious weaknesses, above all in leadership. The senior commanders owed their positions to their political reliability rather than to professional competence. A recent propaganda move ostensibly aiming at a substantial reduction in the strength of the armed forces was used to weed out about 10,000 junior commanders of doubtful loyalty to the communist regime. As a consequence, all units were below establishment in officers and NCOs. The armed forces used weapons and equipment of modern Soviet design—the Army had over 600 T34/85 and JS II tanks; the Air Force flew MIG-15 fighters and IL-28 light bombers.

Even though the Soviet Air Force would have gained complete control of the air almost at once, the Hungarian armed forces, fighting in good order and discipline, had the capability of resisting for some time Soviet attacks aiming at the physical occupation of the country. The Russian Command could not have hoped to conquer Hungary with the

forces at its disposal at the time of the final assault—indeed, 3 times the numbers available would probably have been too little. In particular, Budapest could have been made into another Stalingrad that may have had to be starved into submission. As pointed out earlier, the political obstacles to such long-drawn operations would have been so great as to make probable a compromise solution. To use atomic weapons to bring about a quick decision would have been politically even more unthinkable.

The Soviet Command was thus faced with very real difficulties, of which those of timing were not the least worrisome. To assemble the forces necessary to carry out the plan for what we have called "Case B" obviously must take time. On the other hand, delay meant incurring the danger of the Nagy government getting well entrenched and obtaining political support (e.g. from India or even Red China) which would make Soviet military intervention impossible. For the Soviet leaders it was the age-old military problem all over again of how to strike quickly, yet in sufficient strength to overcome the expected opposition.

By conveniently falling apart, the Hungarian armed forces relieved the Russians of the necessity of solving that problem. It is really not relevant to our inquiry, but it may be well to state here that the main reason for the disintegration of the one force in the country which could have made the revolution victorious (and that without fighting) was absence of leadership; Senior officers, if they were not outright pro-Soviet, vacillated until their troops just melted away, some joining the freedom fighters as individuals, some simply going home. The very few

### Hungarian soldiers march in funeral procession for dead comrades

Wide World Photo







Wide World Photo

### **Russian tank in Budapest — Oct 1956**

Hungarian units which remained intact—none in more than battalion strength—showed what might have been done if there had been an army fighting instead of scattered battle groups.

#### **A Cheap Victory**

It remains to describe briefly the actual military operations conducted during the Hungarian Revolution. The police action, our "Case A", lasted for less than 48 hours (24 and 25 October); all subsequent fighting up to the evacuation of Budapest (30/31 October) involving troops of the Soviet 2d and 17th Mechanized Divisions aimed primarily at orderly disengagement. The Soviet Command can not have been happy about the type of operations it was engaged in during this period. The troops available—at most 10 battalions, comprising the tank and reconnaissance elements of the 2 divisions, certainly not more than 6,000 men—were insufficient to deal with a large-scale uprising such as developed in Budapest on the night of 23/24 October. They may have been effective if they could have been used as a compact battering ram, but political considerations prevented that: Mr. Gerö and Mr. Andropov must have thought at first that it would be possible to regain control without all-out Soviet military action which was bound to inflame the population even more against the Russians. Consequently, the Soviet armour was used in penny-packets and in the main to bail out the AVH troops whenever the latter got themselves into a scrape. That this was the pattern of Soviet action appears clearly from the many descriptions we have of the main engagements of that period, and in particular the 2 most important, the battles for the Corvin Cinema block

and for the Kilián Barracks.

Not later than on 25 October the Soviet Command must have appreciated that its military action in Budapest was leading nowhere and that something more effective was needed, or, in other words, that it was time to call off operations under "Case A" and to put into effect "Case B." As was pointed out earlier, preliminary troop movements for this eventuality had begun 5 days earlier, but they had been confined to the immediate border areas. The officer who was to command in the (as far as could be foreseen) very difficult campaign had, following a practice established in the Second World War, been brought in from the General Staff in Moscow. He was General Malinin, head of the operations section and deputy chief of staff. His appointment shows that the Russians, uncertain about the attitude of the Hungarian armed forces, were by no means counting on a military "push-over." The advance into western Hungary of the 2 Soviet mechanized divisions from Roumania, begun on 26 October, was the first positive move toward the implementation of the plan for "Case B."

If we accept that there was a definite break-off date between "Case A" and "Case B"—we suggested 25 October—and thus that there were 2 unconnected sets of Soviet military operations in Hungary, then the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their re-entry a few days later make military sense. This was generally considered a deception on the part of the Russians. It was certainly pleasant for the Russian commander to be able to deceive the enemy while in fact executing a maneuver that was necessary in any case: the clearing of the axes of advance of the troops assigned to the

storming of Budapest under the plan for "Case B." Anybody who knows how difficult it is to change long-prepared and rehearsed plans and what chaos can ensue when troops, making a fighting advance through the maze of streets of a big city, come upon their own men, will appreciate how indispensable it was for the Soviet Command to get their units scattered through Budapest out of the way.

The start of Soviet movements toward implementation of their plan for "Case B" marked also the beginning of a period of a few days during which the new Hungarian government could have thwarted Russian designs by energetic military counter-action (an example of how this could be done was given in Poland a week earlier) and thereby probably saved the revolution. For this there was time as late as on 28 October when, by all accounts, Mr. Nagy became premier of Hungary in fact instead of in name only. Such counter-action would have involved barring the way to the Soviet troops, thus denying them the use of road and rail communications outside their area of concentration, and preventing them from occupying key military positions. (This would have forced the Russians either to fight for their freedom of movement or to stop their deployment for the attack. The latter is by far the likelier.) Nothing of the kind was done. On the contrary: instructions were given that Soviet troop movements were not to be interfered with as it was hoped that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary would be achieved through negotiations with Moscow. These instructions remained in force even after 1 November, that is, after the Hungarian declaration of neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the failure (from the Soviet point of view) of the mission to Budapest of Messrs. Mikoyan and Suslov, and the defection of János Kádár and his group made renewed Soviet armed intervention practically a certainty. In the meantime, the destruction from within of the Hungarian regular forces was capped by the official recognition of revolutionary councils of the armed forces and by the formation of a National Guard composed of freedom fighters which was to be the main military instru-



ment of the new regime. It is only fair to say that these fatal steps merely meant that the existing situation was recognized for what it was. By the beginning of November the Hungarian armed forces had ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

At about 0300 on 4 November the Russian assault started. There are some indications that it was launched ahead of the planned date and before the deployment of the Soviet forces was finished, on direct orders from Moscow. On the Russian side there were available about 10 divisions and parts of a tactical air army, or over 120,000 men with perhaps 2,500 armored fighting vehicles (tanks, self-propelled guns on tank chassis, armored cars). About a third of this force attacked Budapest itself. On the Hungarian side, the only organized mobile force available to General Király, military commandant of the city, were about 400 men and 8 tanks. The military value of the freedom fighters—brave to the extreme as they all were—varied from "fair" to "useless." In the former category were many of the factory workers who, being army reservists, were able to give a good account of themselves, even though they lacked proper organization and command. In the latter category were the young enthusiasts who provided foreign journalists with the most heart-warming stories and pictures—such as the pretty young girl who was standing, tommy-gun hanging from her shoulder, in the turret of a tank (which she could not steer, whose gun she could not fire, and whose communication equipment she could not work), or the little boy lugging a rifle almost as long as he was, but who must at times have been nothing but a burden for anybody who wanted to organize an effective defense against well-trained and disciplined troops.

As was inevitable under the circumstances, it was all over within hours. In fact, in Budapest, the Soviet Command gained all its main objectives by 0800 although scattered resistance in the capital continued for another 5 days, and in the provinces for a little longer. The rather crude tactics employed by the Russians (which led to avoidable losses in armoured vehicles and to heavy casualties among Hungarian

non-combatants—they just rammed their tanks through the city streets shooting up anything in sight) can be explained by their desire to finish the job as quickly as possible, without any regard to the amount of material damage caused and blood spilled.

### The Lessons

Much as we may detest the Soviet action against Hungary, we must not be blind to the fact that from the purely military point of view the Russians acted with remarkable foresight, resoluteness and skill. They had to mount an operation against a potentially very strong enemy which had to be brought to a favorable conclusion with lightning speed yet with conventional weapons only. This had to be done in an area where only comparatively weak forces were immediately available and with a single line of communication of quite limited capacity. There is no doubt that to make up the plan for the military conquest of Hungary if need be—what we called "Case B"—was a difficult professional job requiring a very careful weighing of all factors, and particularly of that of time. In brief, the Soviet

operations in Hungary, except that the proof of the pudding is missing as there was no serious fighting, is—as was pointed out in the beginning—an example of what is required for a "brush-fire" type of war. We may well examine whether in a similar military situation, but in a better cause, we would be capable of doing as well. Such an examination would of necessity touch our very concept of future war.

There are, of course, also other military lessons that can be drawn from the Hungarian Revolution. Most of them are self-evident, but one is of particular importance: The Kremlin is clearly facing a dilemma when it comes to the arming and training of the satellite forces. They must be kept strong and efficient as an instrument of political pressure upon free Europe, but particularly as a means of keeping in power unpopular communist puppet regimes. But if the satellite forces are strong and efficient they may well help to thwart the Kremlin's policies, as they did in Yugoslavia in 1948 and in Poland in 1956, and as they might have done in Hungary if they had only stood together. US & MC

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The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

**THE GREAT DETERRENT**—*Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$6.00*

The material in this volume, which was assembled for use in the training of young officers in Great Britain's three fighting services, covers an extremely wide range, both in time and subject matter. Sir John Slessor analyzes and discusses the strategic problems which followed the development of mechanized warfare and the subsequent growth of air power. His views on the efficacy of the hydrogen bomb as a deterrent should provide a precise and unclouded outlook for the interpretation of its purpose, its potentialities and its threat.

**NAVAL ARCHITECTURE OF SMALL CRAFT**—*D. Phillips-Birt. Philosophical Library, NY. \$15.00*

This book is concerned with naval architecture in its application to the smaller vessels, i.e., those of about 120 feet in length or less. Here the contemporary knowledge of naval architecture has been sifted to leave that having a practical application to the smaller craft. Basic textbook rudiments are not considered, but many interesting and controversial issues in modern naval architecture are discussed and presented clearly from a practical rather than a theoretical point of view. As a guide to further study, bibliographies of the various subjects are given.

**NO TOMORROW—NO YESTERDAY**—*Wade Burkhart. Pageant Press, NY. \$3.50*

This is the saga of an American submarine and her crew patrolling Japanese waters during WWII. It is the story of life aboard a submarine, describing the human conflicts, the loyalty, the heroism, the boredom and excitement of patrol duty in enemy waters. The author enlisted in 1938, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1944 and is a veteran of 3 war patrols in the South China Sea, Tokyo area and Sea of

Okhotsk. He is presently a sales engineer in New York.

**THE SMALLER DRAGON**—*Joseph Buttinger. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$6.00*

Ten years ago not even the name of Vietnam, the country of *The Smaller Dragon*, was known in the West. Today Vietnam has become for millions of newspaper readers the embattled land of the Indochina war, and another divided country in which the conflict between the Communist bloc and the Western powers has produced 2 rival political regimes. Most recently Vietnam also became famous as the country of President Ngo Dinh Diem who, by defeating his Communist, colonialist and feudal enemies, has confounded all the political prophets of doom. Almost as by a miracle, an anti-Communist South Vietnam has survived. This is the story.

**HMS FIDELITY**—*Marcel Jullian. W. W. Norton & Co., NY. \$3.75*

An old French cargo vessel, *HMS Fidelity* was transformed during WWII into a "mystery ship." She was commanded by a French officer, part hero, part madman, who took her from the Vichy French and bullied the British into signing her over into the Royal Navy. He carried aboard champagne and his mistress. In the end, on a dark New Year's Eve on a secret mission, *HMS Fidelity* silently disappeared with all hands. From French and British records and from the recollections of 2 of the *Fidelity's* crew—the only 2 who did not go on her last sortie—the author has drawn the facts of this tale.

**ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND MOONS**—*Charles Coombs. William Morrow & Co., NY. \$3.75*

Beginning with the story of an actual missile launching at Cape Canaveral, the book goes on to discuss the rockets and missiles now being used and tested. This is a broad and generalized survey of intermediate range ballistic missiles,

intercontinental ballistic missiles and projected earth satellites. The volume contains 79 photographs.

**POCKET BATTLESHIP: The Story of the Admiral Scheer**—*Adm Theodor Krancke and H. J. Brennecke. W. W. Norton & Co., NY. \$3.95*

The commander of the battleship *Scheer*, now Adm Krancke, and the German naval writer, H. J. Brennecke, have cooperated to give an account of the exploits of "the lucky ship," as the Germans called her. She sank 152,000 tons of Allied shipping in the North Atlantic, including the auxiliary cruiser *Jervis Bay* and her gallant crew. The *Scheer* also carried out successful operations from the equator to the Arctic circle, but before the end of the war retribution came from the RAF and she was sunk in Kiel harbor. This is her dramatic story.

**AIRCRAFT ANNUAL 1958**—*Edited by John W. R. Taylor. Philosophical Library, NY. \$6.00*

This British publication contains up-to-date information on the advance of the air age in a series of profusely illustrated articles. Thoroughly reviewed are both civil and military aircraft of the major powers. The 96 pages deal with gliders and jets, VTOL and missiles.

**I WAS A SLAVE IN RUSSIA**—*John Noble. Devin-Adair Co., NY. \$3.75*

The author was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1945, shuttled from prison to prison and ended up in Vorkuta, 50 miles above the Arctic Circle, where it is too cold for bacteria to survive. While the Russians kept his name out of their files and refused to acknowledge his US citizenship, he was kept working in the mines pushing 2-ton coal cars even after his weight had dropped from 155 to 95 pounds. He tells the story of his life in Vorkuta, including the famous slave uprising in 1953 after Beria's arrest. He now spends most of his time lecturing throughout the United States.



**AN ATLAS OF WORLD AFFAIRS**  
—Andrew Boyd. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$3.00

More than 70 newly drawn maps focus on the most important territorial disputes, alliances, political trends and economic factors in our modern world. A brief text accompanies each of the maps, explaining the background and summarizing the situation. SEATO, West Indian Federation, Canada's booming Arctic, the geography of oil and uranium, the dollar markets, Ghana and Togoland, economic aid programs, the politics of the Arab world—these are all among the full range of topics covered. Andrew Boyd is Assistant Editor of the British magazine, *The Economist*.

**SHARKS AND THE LITTLE FISH**  
—Wolfgang Ott. Pantheon Books, NY. \$1.95

A description of naval warfare from the German side. A WWII story of life on a German mine sweeper and later a submarine. The author was barely 17 years old when he was called into naval service first as a seaman on a mine sweeper, and later as an ensign on a submarine. In the characters in this volume a generation becomes articulate that has faith in nothing, that has only known senseless sacrifice. Ott exposes what it was like to fight and die without belief in a cause. This book has been widely praised in West Germany.

**HOW GOOD IS YOUR CHESS?**—Leonard Barden. D. Van Nostrand Co., NY. \$3.75

The surest method of becoming an expert at chess is to study the games of the great masters. This book gives the reader the experience of himself playing alongside and against a master. The reader works out each move for himself, and notes are designed to explain fully to the ordinary player the pros and cons of the alternatives he is likely to choose. At the end of each game the author gives practical suggestions as to how the reader can eliminate playing weaknesses which the game brings to light. The author, who won the British Chess Championship in 1954, is a noted writer on chess matters.

**MEN AGAINST THE FROZEN NORTH**—Ritchie Calder. McMillan, NY. \$3.75

Mr. Calder has traversed the Snow Barrens and the Polar seas to the outposts of the Arctic to see what science and an indomitable pioneering spirit can achieve in making this region part of our habitable world. His journey by aeroplane, dog-sledge and snow-tractor was made in 5 huge "sweeps," totalling 40,000 miles.

**WHAT MAN MAY BE**—George Russell Harrison. William Morrow & Co., NY. \$4.00

In the short span of 50 years science has literally transformed the world we live in—so that, within living memory, a seemingly known and ordered world has given way to one both new and strange; a world in which the person without specific scientific orientation finds himself—even while he enjoys the material comforts science provides—confused and confounded in respect to the deeper issues of human life and destiny. It is to this situation that Dr. Harrison has addressed himself.

**SURVIVAL IN THE SKY**—Charles Coombs. William Morrow & Co., NY. \$3.75

Here is the story of the work done by aeronautical engineers, specialists in aviation medicine, and test pilots to overcome the handicaps imposed on the minds and bodies of men by high-speed and high-altitude flight. Beginning with a step-by-step description of what it's like to bail out in an ejection seat at 42,000 feet, Mr. Coombs goes on to explain the dangerous effects of extreme temperatures and the problems created by too much or too little oxygen, atmospheric pressure or gravity. The volume is based on the author's own experience and a survey of the work in progress at Air Force and Navy research centers.

**RIVER IN THE SEA**—Hans Leip. G. P. Putnam's Sons, NY. \$3.75

Driven by the Trade Winds, flowing from the Gulf of Mexico along the Eastern seaboard of the United States and across the Atlantic to Europe is a great current of warm water whose volume exceeds that of all the rivers in the world combined—the Gulf Stream. This book tells the absorbing story of the role that stream has played in the affairs of men through the ages and of man's efforts to learn more of this fabulous river in the sea.

**AMERICAN ACES**—Edward H. Sims. Harper & Bros., NY. \$3.95

This book recounts the most exciting fighter missions flown by our 12 top surviving US Army Air Force fliers during WWII. The author, a veteran of 33 fighter missions over Germany during the war, has traveled more than 40,000 miles interviewing each pilot. Using these first-hand accounts and the official records, Mr. Sims has recreated each mission from start to finish. The Foreword is by Gen Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO AUTOMATIC COMPUTERS**—Ned Chapin. D. Van Nostrand Co., NY. \$8.75

For the businessman, accountant, or systems engineer who wants a quick, sure understanding of the profitable use of an automatic computer, this clearly written guide by a noted authority will give you all the basic facts you need.

**A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL IV—The Great Democracies**—Winston S. Churchill. Dodd, Mead & Co., NY. \$6.00

This final volume of Churchill's history devotes more than one-third of its content to the Civil War and to American affairs generally. Lee is his military and Lincoln his political hero. Churchill brings a perspective and interpretation which are refreshingly new to American readers. Here also is the consummation in the reign of Victoria of the building of the British Empire. Here are stirring events in the Crimean War, the "Teutonic menace," the migrations to Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, the rise of the Great Democracies.

**UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: Rearming the French**—Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, GPO, Washington. \$4.25.

When French national forces went back into the war against the Axis powers in mid-November 1942, their re-emergence on the battle fields heralded the start of an early large-scale American experiment in mutual aid. Opening with a brief review of the assistance similarly extended by France to an unprepared America in 1917-18, the narrative covers the beginnings of the rearmament program in North Africa and proceeds through the eventual entry of the North African forces into combat in the Mediterranean, Italy and France. This volume is based on American and French documentary sources, as well as personal interviews and letters.

**RUSSIA, THE ATOM AND THE WEST**—George F. Kennan. Harper & Brothers, NY. \$2.50.

Mr. Kennan surveys the whole world scene and comes up with some startling suggestions—military, political, economic and ethical. When the first 6 chapters of this book were released as the Reith Lectures, delivered by Mr. Kennan over the BBC in England, they made front-page stories all over the world and started a debate which will probably continue for some time.





## PASSING IN REVIEW

### The Third Volume, 1688-1815 . . .

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION — Winston S. Churchill. 402 pages, illustrated. Dodd, Mead & Co., NY. \$6.00

This third volume of Sir Winston's four-volume work on the history of the English speaking peoples covers the period 1688 to 1815. Twice during these years England met the challenge of powerful continental alliances and twice she emerged from these conflicts the victor. First, William the III with the sword of Marlborough shattered the power of Louis XIV; later Wellington brought an end to Napoleon's dream of a United States of Europe, at Waterloo. During these same years the American War of Independence divided the English speaking peoples into 2 branches, each thereafter to pursue its separate destiny. Towards the end of this stirring period the French Revolution established the equality of men in a period of violence comparable only to the Russian Revolution of more recent times.

But the revolutions and the wars which highlight the history of these 127 years are only part of the story. At the beginning, the British Isles became united. Later, British overseas possessions grew, and under the elder Pitt the first British Empire with domains in India and America came into being. This was a great period of awakening. The people of Asia were being brought under the influence of Europe, and with the passage of years the ideas of freedom and nationalism which the Europeans brought were to grow and eventually emerge into the vast complex of modern independent states. The American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of that new country were to set an enduring pattern to be repeated in other places and other tongues wherever people sought to govern themselves.

This period of revolution spanning 5 generations was the beginning of modern history. Towards the end, the industrial revolution and the vast overseas interests of Great Britain were to establish it as the major power of the civilized world. And during these same years the American branch of the English speaking community was to find in the

vigor if its people and the stability of its government the elements required for steady growth.

Written history, even that of the "popular" sort is so frequently confined in time or place that the interplay of influences external to these two factors is obscured if not in fact omitted. How difficult it will be, for example, if in 100 years we were to study the history of the United States from 1900 to 1950 without at the same time keeping in sharp focus the tremendous development of Russia. The great merit in Sir Winston's history of the English speaking peoples is that it flows with a broad majestic sweep and includes the necessary details without ever omitting relevant relationships: the interplay of these national and international elements essential to a comprehension of any period in question.

Sir Winston writes history in a manner which holds the attention most often reserved for novels. He weaves his story of men, their ideas and the events of their times with careful attention to proper perspective; a versatility due to broad knowledge of his subject and a well established competence with the language. After reading these first three volumes, the completion of the fourth and concluding book can only be awaited with considerable anticipation.

Reviewed by Col V. J. Croizat

Ed: Col Croizat is presently assigned to Plans Branch, G-3, HQMC.

### The Blitz of London . . .

THE WINTER OF THE BOMBS — Constantine Fitzgibbon; 271 pages, illustrated; W. W. Norton & Co., NY. \$3.95

Ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world has pondered the question of the qualitative and quantitative jump in the magnitude of firepower. The development of nuclear munitions has continued as has the various means for delivering them. Just as in the past history of the evolution of warfare, all thinking people are concerned with designing and controlling the concepts which will govern the use of these new weapons. Thus, when a book presents the facts so

carefully as in the case of the civil-military defense of London in 1940-41, we should take note of it in our search for the Christian solution to the employment of nuclear munitions.

*The Winter of the Bombs* tells the story of the Blitz of London covering the period from 7 September 1940 to 11 May 1941. It is factual reporting based on unquestioned sources of information. To make the narrative alive, the personal memories of events are quoted.

The author has told his story by picturing the events of Saturday, 7 September 1940, when the German Air Force set out to destroy London, and the ensuing 57 nights; followed by the events of the next 6 months. He examines, quite briefly, the emotional, political and military background to the terrible winter that London endured.

He highlights the development of the civil defense forces. The pre-bombing predictions of the degree of catastrophe to be expected from such enemy action against a heavily populated area, and the actual happenings, give one cause to reflect on our situation today.

The use of air-raid shelters and the enemy's use of fire in addition to high explosives, posed civil defense problems and brought forth the highest order of citizenship and heroism. The detailed descriptions of the bombing of the famous London restaurant, Café de Paris, is a most vivid reading experience.

The author, Constantine Fitzgibbon, was born in Lenox, Mass., in 1919. He studied in Europe and was at Oxford University in 1939, when the war started. He served as a volunteer in the British Army. After Pearl Harbor, he transferred to the US Army, serving in infantry and later, on Gen Bradley's staff.

Based on his war experiences, he wrote a study of the German officers' 1944 revolt, called *Twenty July*. He has published 5 novels in addition to this one, as well as numerous other writings.

*The Winter of the Bombs* is of interest to the professional soldier and to civilians alike, as it provides a wealth of background material upon which they can understand and evaluate today's civil defense-military defense problems.

The author's acknowledgments at the end of the book provide a summary of the 4 major sources of his information: the newspapers, Government and other archives, other people's books, and personal memories and papers.

Reviewed by Col H. Nickerson, Jr.

Ed: Formerly Director of Senior School, Col Nickerson is presently on the staff of the CG, FMFLant.

## The Ludendorf Bridge . . .

THE BRIDGE AT REMAGEN — Ken Hechler. 228 pages, maps and illustrations. Ballantine Books, Inc., NY. Paper bound, \$.50; hard cover, \$4.50

The capture of the Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen, Germany on 7 March 1945 was one of the most incredible pieces of luck that fell to the American Army during WWII. Elements of the 9th Armored Division arriving at Remagen could hardly believe their eyes when they saw the bridge across the Rhine still intact. The Allied high command assumed that by the time US and British forces reached the Rhine river that all bridges would have been destroyed. The Germans with supreme confidence in their own thoroughness made the same assumption. As a result of its loss, Field Marshal von Rundstedt was dismissed as Commander in Chief of the German Army in the West; 50,000 German soldiers were taken prisoner, and the war materially shortened thereby saving thousands of lives.

Several of the major factors contributing to the failure to destroy this vital bridge were: the complex chain of operational command of the German forces in the West, from which the local bridge commander could get no decision relative to the bridge's destruction; failure to supply enough demolition material to completely blow the bridge, and just plain bad luck at the wrong time. Five German officers paid with their lives after being summarily tried for the loss of the bridge. None was above the rank of Major — the buck was passed right down the line.

The author writes from a first hand knowledge as he was in charge of an Army historical unit assigned to Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division when they secured the bridge. He talked with the officers and men of the company that assaulted the bridge and crossed it initially. All of the book is based on extensive interviews with both German as well as the US participants.

The writer has the knack of giving the reader a most clear account of the "big picture" that led up to this stunning victory at Remagen. The action taken from Army level down to the action by the leading company is easy to follow and exciting reading. This is a pleasant relief from some of the involved military narratives of WWII.

The story of any victory is the story of the individual who made it come about. In this case it was 1stLt Karl Timmerman of West Point, Nebraska, a man of German-American origin who came from the wrong side of the tracks in his home town. His part at Remagen bridge apparently has not been appre-

ciated by his home town; in fact, it has been belittled. The Lt received a DSC for leading the assault across the bridge in the face of almost certain death (the assault elements did not know that with the first attempt to "blow" the Germans had shot their bolt). Following the war Timmerman died of cancer. The author suggests that West Point, Nebraska, treated him rather shabbily, and that they would do well to honor the memory of a brave man.

It is a story of the luck, daring, and courage of the average American soldier when the chips are down.

The price is low. It is worth much more. Inspiring as well as entertaining.

Reviewed by LtCol R. S. Johnson

ED: The reviewer, LtCol Johnson is assigned to the 2d MAW with the exchange program. The study of battles and campaigns of WWII is his hobby.

## Where Are We Going? . . .

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY —

Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. 474 pages. Rinehart & Company, Inc., NY. \$6.50

Today, as never before in the history of this country, Americans are asking themselves the question — where are we going? A gnawing doubt as to the effectiveness of our national policies is reflected in the puzzlement, anger and fear of the man in the street, and in the government, too. We have eyed the Russians and World Communism with distaste before, but this attitude has now become interlaced with apprehension. For the first time since the industrial revolution, another country is evidently capable of greater technological effort than our own. These new facts of life are unforgettably etched on our horizons as 2 space satellites born of Communistic endeavor streak unchallenged over the American continent each day.

Against this background, a book purporting to delineate our military policy should be closely examined to provide an assessment of our policies in relation to their flexibility, adaptability and overall worth in the face of rapid changes in the balance of world power. Although *American Military Policy* was written before the launching of the Russian space satellites, it is, nevertheless, worthwhile and topical reading within the limitations discussed below.

Mr. Furniss' stated purpose is to "inquire into the nature of the military component in American statecraft." The book is composed of selected writings from a wide range of military and non-military personnel, with chapter lead-offs by the author. One of the contributors is Gen Alfred M. Gruenther who dis-

cusses the growth of NATO in developing strength for European defense. He also provides an enlightening glimpse of the basic differences in American and Russian political and military philosophy by quoting some of the off-the-cuff discussions he had with his Russian opposite number in Vienna in 1945.

Philip Wylie describes in accents of doom the probable reaction of the people of the US to nuclear attack. He makes a convincing case to prove that millions of lives alone will be lost from the consequences of sheer panic and the soft, cocoon-protected existence of the American public. He also points out that if all of Russia's big cities are smashed only 15 per cent of the Russian population will feel the immediate effects. If only two score of our larger cities are hit, 66 per cent of all Americans will swiftly know a full measure of horror.

Adm Carney, Gen Ridgeway, Secretary of State Dulles, Lord Ismay and at least a score more distinguished individuals have contributed searching analyses of American military and foreign policy.

Where the book fails, and this is not so much a failure of authorship as it is a problem inherent to the subject, lies in the lack of a clear policy picture to give the reader. Mr. Furniss, in attempting a forthright appraisal, has given the reader an honest sampling of our top military and civilian thought on the most pressing problems of the day. What has emerged is a groupment of antithetical ideas, introspective and soul-searching, but containing no coherent statement of policy.

Take a deep breath before you plunge into this one.

Reviewed by Maj C. F. Runyan

ED: Head of the Officer Planning and Distribution Unit, Detail Branch, HQ-MC, Maj Runyan is the author of Capt McLane Tilton and the Korean Incident of 1871 (GAZETTE, Feb-Mar '58).

## A Legless RAF Pilot . . .

BEST FOOT FORWARD — Colin Hodgkinson; 269 pages, illustrated; W. W. Norton and Co., NY. \$3.95

The autobiography of Colin Hodgkinson begins with his earliest boyhood recollection of home on an estate in England where he cultivated the graces of life by riding to the hounds upon his father's best horse. The killing of the defenseless animals in the pursuit of costly and dangerous sports in which his father indulged disturbed the boy deeply and implanted an extreme distaste for the physical details of destruction



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which he considered secretly as a shameful weakness. Paradoxically, his father, a pilot in the First World War, held the boy enthralled with tales "of duel in the air as the only and cleanest form of personal combat left in modern war." The boy's inner conflict was complicated further by financial reverses, which withdrew him roughly from the luxury to which he was accustomed, and his father's desertion of the family.

With the approach of the Second World War, he felt obliged to overcome his secret weakness and, still fascinated by his father's tales of aerial combat, became a student aviator in the Royal Navy. While on an instrument training flight, he was involved in a mid-air collision resulting in facial disfigurement and the loss of his right leg below the hip. His smashed left leg failed to heal properly. As an invalid, he chose to suffer the loss of his left leg below the knee in the hope of being able to return to flying. This decision, prompted by despair, fear and shame as well as courage, was the beginning of a period of extreme physical and mental anguish while he underwent plastic surgery and learned to walk on his "tin" legs. The agony continued through return to active duty as a control tower operator, through endless letters and interviews persuading the authorities to allow him to return to flying, through the remainder of flight training and duty as a pilot with the Royal Navy, through transfer to the Royal Air Force and remained unabated until the day he joined the RAF fighter squadron and was nicknamed "Hoppy" immediately. From that day forward, Hoppy Hodgkinson devoted his efforts to learning intimately the physical details of destruction which he so detested as a boy.

A major portion of the book is devoted to the exploits of the author as an expert fighter pilot operating Spitfire airplanes during the Second World War.

All alone on a weather reconnaissance flight over France, an untested oxygen system failed at high altitude and the author crashed. Further facial disfigurement, impairment of vision in one eye and irreparable damage to the artificial legs were among the more lasting effects of this crash. The events which followed, as a prisoner of war in Germany, show the author's keen ability to evaluate and understand the people around him, friend and enemy alike, while injured severely, helpless without serviceable legs and living only for the day of repatriation.

Exchanged by the Germans because of his weakened physical condition which made him unsuitable for further combat, apparently, the author returned to

the RAF and flying. Two incidents followed in which he nearly lost his life while flying jet airplanes under instrument conditions. At this point Colin Hodgkinson admits that he lost his nerve. He achieved his "last and most bitterly contested reconciliation with flying" while, as a passenger on a test flight of the Caravelle, a large version of the Comet jet airliner, failure of the cabin pressurization system aroused the same panic he had experienced on the occasion when he became a prisoner of war. This time he conquered his fear and found peace with himself.

The book is a marvelous study in the art of understatement at which the British seem to excel. A man's life is portrayed with such admirable restraint that the reader, accustomed to the superlatives of American advertising, is refreshed from the reading. There are no false heroics and the accounts of aerial battle ring true.

*Best Foot Forward* would make a marvelous motion picture and the reading of it is recommended as diversion for an evening; however, there is little or no technical information contained within its covers worthy of study. The book is not recommended for those in search of technical information on aviation or historical facts of the period.

Reviewed by Capt J. G. Martz III

ED: *A Naval Aviator, Capt Martz is serving with Air Development Squadron FIVE, NOTS, China Lake, Calif.*

### The Yucatan Expedition . . .

DESTINY AND GLORY — Edward S. Wallace. 320 pages, illustrated. Coward-McCann, Inc., NY. \$5.00

One of the results of the Mexican War was the addition of vast territory to the United States. With the acquisition of these new lands came the conviction on the part of some Americans that it was the manifest destiny of the US to bring into this country the many Caribbean, Central and South American states incapable of ruling themselves or under the domination of Spain. Another reason for conquest advanced by some Southerners was the necessity for bolstering the South's position in the growing rift with the North by the addition of more slave states. They hoped to gain these states by the annexation of Cuba and perhaps other Latin American countries. Regardless of motivation, be it adventure or politics, there grew up between the Mexican and Civil Wars groups of American "filibusters," as they were called, who, despite the disapproval of our government, engaged in expeditions to overthrow these Latin American governments by force.



In *Destiny and Glory*, Edward S. Wallace tells of these filibusters from the ill-fated Yucatan expedition in 1848-49, to the march of Confederate Gen Jo Shelby with the remnants of his Missouri cavalry brigade after the Civil War to offer his services to the luckless Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico. All of these expeditions failed. Perhaps the best known today is the almost successful attempt of William Walker in Nicaragua, where he established himself for a time as president in 1856.

Dr. Wallace treats these various filibusters in chronological order devoting a chapter or more to each. Not only does he cover the actual events but he also gives the background and motives for these expeditions. A dearth of source material has hampered the author in presenting a fuller story of some of the more obscure forays. Yet, he has created a very readable picture of this intriguing and little known phase of our history.

The author has degrees from Yale (A.B.), Harvard (M.A.), and Boston University (Ph.D.). As an historian, Dr. Wallace has long been interested in the Mexican War, having authored in this connection, *General William Jenkins Worth: Monterey's Forgotten Hero*. He has also written *The Great Reconnaissance*, the story of the marking of the new boundary between the United States and Mexico after the Mexican War, and, with MajGen John K. Herr, co-authored *The Story of the U. S. Cavalry*. *Destiny and Glory* is a natural outgrowth of his interest in the Mexican War, for many of its veterans became the major and minor figures in the filibusters about which he has written such an interesting account.

Reviewed by LtCol C. T. Earnest, USA

Ed: LtCol Earnest is USCONARC, Liaison Officer stationed at MCS, Quantico, Va.

#### A Memorable Battle . . .

TRAFALGAR—Rene Maine. 261 pages. Charles Scribner's Sons, NY. \$4.50

Trafalgar was a memorable battle in every respect. Its influence upon history was profound. It destroyed forever Napoleon's dream of invading England. It brought to an end the 100 years' struggle between England and France for control of the seas. It gave England the Oceanic Empire which was to endure for over a century and make possible the *Pax Britannica*. Of more immediate importance was the fact Trafalgar showed the world of 1805 that Napoleon was not invincible, and it forced him to fall back on his Continental system in effort to establish an empire which could strangle England economically. His efforts instead ended in his own political strangulation. Without Trafalgar the Peninsular War would have been impossible, and without the Peninsular War a Waterloo seems unlikely. All this points to the conclusion that Trafalgar was the decisive battle in the Napoleonic War.

M. Maine is of the opinion that his readers can better appreciate the significance of Trafalgar if they understand what went before. His book is based on that design. It makes fascinating reading; it is well written, and beautifully translated.

The book begins with an account of Napoleon's vast preparations for the invasion of England. He planned it for December of 1803. It was to be a shore-to-shore operation performed in one night, and would comprise 2,155 vessels to transport and protect the 115,000 men, 11,000 horses and 450 field guns. The force was assembled, the craft built, and there was incessant training. But the operation never came off. The great project was doomed by the incapacity of the French to win command of the English Channel even for a few hours. This was partly because France had no effective naval leadership. Villeneuve, whom Napoleon placed in command at sea, "in no way lacked personal courage, but by temperament he was a defeatist. He did not believe in Napoleon's project of invading England, had no confidence in either his subordinates or his allies, and worst of all, had none in him-

self." The Emperor had a share in the blame, too. For one thing, "the sea had no place in Napoleon's make-up. It escaped his genius, it tried his patience, and it bedevilled his normally clear vision. He turned to the sea at the wrong moment, and besides, he had not the means of putting himself on an equal footing with England, even with luck on his side." For another, he wouldn't let his Admirals alone. They were always terrified of being condemned for the most trifling of actions. "For Napoleon was the supreme arbiter, and reserved once and for all the right of personally ordering the movements of all units of the fleet, even if they were 10,000 miles away. He would comment, protest, possibly approve, and finally send off via Decrees a reply, an order or a counter order, a reprimand, or a commendation that never reached its destination at the right time."

On the other hand, England had outstanding naval leadership in abundance. At Trafalgar there was the incomparable Nelson, "a bold and imaginative tactician, independent in outlook, ambitious . . . his moral courage was extraordinary."

Throughout the book the reader gains the impression that the English understood the sea, and reveled in it; the French feared and mistrusted it, and treated it as an enemy. The end product of these divergent attitudes was Trafalgar. The present account of that battle is not only clear, but manages to convey much of the excitement—and horror—of 19th century naval warfare.

Rene Maine is a Frenchman. He has previously published what the dust jacket of the book proclaims to be "standard works" on the Battle of Jutland, and Lepereuse, the French navigator of the eighteenth century. His naval background would thus seem to be well established. *Trafalgar* gives him high marks in the literary sense.

Reviewed by Maj J. M. Jefferson, Jr.

Ed: Prior to his present assignment to HQMC, Maj Jefferson was assistant Naval Attache, Tokyo, Japan.



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**Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians**

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A total of \$2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1958 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

## General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
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4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1958.

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